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1 Introduction
Are asset prices aligned with the consensus opinion on the fundamentals in the market? A
(somewhat) simplistic version of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), provides an affir-
mative answer to this question. According to this view competition among rational investors
will drive prices to be centered around the consensus estimate (average expectations) of under-
lying value given available information. This proposition has generated much debate among
economists and in the finance profession.1
In his General Theory, Keynes pioneered the vision of stock markets being prey of short-run
speculation with prices loosely linked to fundamentals. This view tends to portray a stock
market dominated by herding, behavioral biases, fads, booms and crashes (see, for example,
Shiller (2000)), and goes against the tradition of considering market prices as aggregators of the
dispersed information in the economy advocated by Hayek (1945) and followed by the modern
tradition of the rational expectations analysis. According to the latter view prices reflect,
perhaps noisily, the collective information that each trader has about the fundamental value
of the asset (see, for example, Grossman (1989)), and provide a reliable signal about assets’
liquidation values.
There is thus a tension between the Keynesian and the Hayekian views of financial market
dynamics, with the first emphasizing short-run speculation and the latter long run informational
efficiency. Keynes, however, distinguished between enterprise, or the activity of forecasting the
prospective yield of assets over their whole life (where the investor focuses on the “long-term
prospects and those only”), and short term speculation.2 While the former corresponds to the
simplistic version of the EMH (that is, that prices should equal average expectations of value
plus noise), Keynes thought that in modern stock markets the latter would be king. Recurrent
episodes of bubbles have the flavor of Keynes’ speculation with prices that seem far away from
average expectations of fundamentals in the market.
In this paper, we address the tension between the Keynesian and the Hayekian visions in a
dynamic finite horizon market where investors, except for liquidity traders, have no behavioral
bias and hold a common prior on the liquidation value of the risky asset. We therefore allow for
the possibility that investors concentrate on the long-term prospects in a rich noisy dynamic
rational expectations environment where there is residual uncertainty on the liquidation value
of the asset (so that the collective information of rational investors is not sufficient to recover
the ex-post liquidation value) and where liquidity trading follows a general process.
We find that in most cases in the rational expectations equilibrium, investors find it prof-
itable to engage in short term speculation and this implies that the simplistic version of the
1See, e.g., “Something big in the city,” Jonathan Ford, Financial Times, November 15, 2008. Professional
investors attribute considerable importance to the consensus estimate as a guide to selecting stocks. Bernstein
(1996) reports how in 1995 Neil Wrigth, chief investment officer of ANB Investment Management & Trust,
introduced a strategy “explicitly designed to avoid the Winner’s Curse.” Such a strategy was based on the
composition of a portfolio from stocks with a narrow trading range, “an indication that [these stocks] are priced
around consensus views, with sellers and buyers more or less evenly matched. The assumption is that such
stocks can be bought for little more than their consensus valuation.”
2Keynes, Ch. 12, General Theory (1936).
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EMH does not hold.3 Furthermore, the fact that prices can be systematically farther away or
closer to fundamentals compared to consensus, thereby scoring worse or better than consen-
sus in predicting the fundamentals, is a manifestation of endogenous short-term speculation.
In a static market investors speculate on the difference between the price and the liquidation
value, and prices are aligned with their average expectations about this value. Thus, in this
context the price is just a noisy measure of investors’ consensus opinion. In a dynamic market,
investors speculate also on short-run price differences. With heterogeneous information, this
may misalign prices and investors’ average expectations, potentially leading prices either closer
or farther away from the fundamentals compared to consensus. Two key deep parameters, the
level of residual payoff uncertainty and the degree of persistence of liquidity trades, determine
whether prices predict fundamentals better than consensus. When there is no residual uncer-
tainty on the asset liquidation value and liquidity trading follows a random walk then prices
are aligned with consensus like in a static market. This is one of the boundary cases where
rational investors do not have incentives to speculate on short run price movements. For a
given, positive level of residual uncertainty, low persistence deteriorates the predictive power
of prices vis-a`-vis consensus; conversely, high liquidity trades’ persistence has the opposite ef-
fect. This partitions the parameter space into a Keynesian region, where prices are farther
away from fundamentals than average expectations, and a Hayekian region where the opposite
occurs. The boundary of these regions reflects Keynes’ situation where investors concentrate
on the long-term prospects and where the simplistic version of the EMH holds. In the Keyne-
sian region short run price speculation based on market making motives (reversion of liquidity
trades) predominates, while in the Hayekian region short run price speculation based on infor-
mation (trend chasing) predominates. As a consequence we can characterize accommodation
and trend chasing strategies in a model with rational investors and study how do they map
to momentum (recent performance tends to persist in the near future) and reversal (a longer
history of performance tends to revert).
The intuition for our results is as follows. In a dynamic market, the relationship between
price and fundamentals depends both on the quality of investors’ information and on their
reaction to the aggregate demand. Suppose an investor observes a positive signal and faces a
high demand for the asset. Upon the receipt of good news he increases his long position in
the asset. On the other hand, his reaction to high asset demand is either to accommodate
it, counting on a future price reversal – thereby acting as a “market-maker”– or to follow the
market and further increase his long position anticipating an additional price rise (in this way
“chasing” the trend). The more likely it is that the demand realization reverts over time,
e.g., due to liquidity traders’ transient demand, the more likely that the investor will want to
accommodate it. Conversely, the more likely it is that the demand realization proxies for a stable
trend, e.g., due to the impact of fundamentals information, the more likely that the investor will
3It should be no surprise that in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium prices may be systematically closer
or farther away from the fundamentals compared with investors’ average expectations. This result depends on
the relative weights that in equilibrium traders put on private and public information and, obviously, could not
arise in a fully revealing equilibrium where the price coincides with the liquidation value.
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want to follow the market.4 In the former case, the investor’s long-term speculative position
is partially offset by his market making position. Thus, the impact of private information on
the price is partially sterilized by investors’ market making activity. This, in turn, loosens the
price from the fundamentals in relation to average expectations. Conversely, in the latter case,
the investor’s reaction to the observed aggregate demand realization reinforces his long-term
speculative position. Thus, investors’ trend chasing activity enhances the impact of private
information on the price and tightens the price to the fundamentals in relation to average
expectations.5
Low liquidity trades’ persistence strengthens the mean reversion in aggregate demand, and
tilts investors towards accommodating the aggregate demand. This effect is extreme when the
stock of liquidity traders’ demand is independent across periods.6 The impact of residual uncer-
tainty over the liquidation value, on the other hand, enhances the hedging properties of future
positions, boosting investors’ signal responsiveness and leading them to speculate more aggres-
sively on short-run price differences. Thus, depending on the persistence of liquidity traders’
demand, prices predict fundamentals worse or better than consensus, respectively yielding the
Keynesian and the Hayekian regions. Conversely, when liquidity traders’ demand is very persis-
tent (i.e., when liquidity trades increments are i.i.d.) and absent residual uncertainty, investors
act as in a static market, and prices are aligned with consensus. This, together with the bound-
ary between the Keynesian and the Hayekian regions, identifies the set of parameter values for
which investors concentrate on the asset long term prospects, shying away from short term
speculation. It is for this set of parameter values that the simplistic version of the EMH holds.
Interestingly, the Keynesian and Hayekian regions can be characterized in terms of in-
vestors’ consensus opinion about the systematic behavior of future price changes. Indeed, in
the Hayekian region, investors chase the market because the consensus opinion is that prices
will systematically continue a given trend in the upcoming trading period. In the Keynesian
region, instead, investors accommodate the aggregate demand because the consensus opinion is
that prices will systematically revert. We illustrate how expected price behavior under the lat-
ter metric does not always coincide with a prediction based on the unconditional correlation of
returns. Indeed, as in our setup the evolution of aggregate demand is governed both by a tran-
sient (liquidity trades) and a persistent (fundamentals information) component, depending on
the patterns of private information arrival momentum and reversal can arise. However, due to
the usual signal extraction problem investors face in the presence of heterogeneous information,
these phenomena are compatible with both the Hayekian and Keynesian equilibrium regions.
4In this case, indeed, the aggregate demand is likely to proxy for upcoming good news that are not yet
completely incorporated in the price. There is a vast empirical literature that documents the transient impact
of liquidity trades on asset prices as opposed to the permanent effect due to information-driven trades. See e.g.
Wang (1994), and Llorente et al. (2002).
5Other authors have emphasized the consequences of investors’ reaction to the aggregate demand for an
asset. For example, Gennotte and Leland (1990) argue that investors may exacerbate the price impact of
trades, yielding potentially destabilizing outcomes, by extracting information from the order flow.
6Indeed, assuming that the stock of liquidity trades is i.i.d. implies that the gross position liquidity traders
hold in a given period n completely reverts in period n+1. This lowers the risk of accommodating the aggregate
demand in any period, as investors can always count on the possibility of unwinding their inventory of the risky
asset to liquidity traders in the coming round of trade.
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Furthermore, as reversal and momentum can happen at the frontier between the Keynesian and
Hayekian regions, the simplistic version of the EMH does not preclude return predictability.
Our paper contributes in several aspects to the research investigating asset pricing in the
presence of heterogeneously informed agents. First, it contributes to the literature that analyzes
dynamic trading by competitive, long-term investors in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion. Most of the results in this literature deal with the case in which the information structure
is nested (i.e. where investors’ information sets can be completely ordered in terms of in-
formativeness). Wang (1993) presents results in continuous-time. The effect of a non-nested
information structure (and thus heterogeneously informed agents) is analyzed by Grundy and
McNichols (1989), Brown and Jennings (1989), and Cespa (2002) in the context of a two-period
model. Vives (1995) and He and Wang (1995) study N -period models. The former investigates
the effect of different patterns of information arrival on price efficiency, when prices are set by
competitive, risk-neutral market makers. The latter analyze the patterns of volume in a market
with risk-averse investors. In this paper we also assume that all investors are risk averse and
provide a novel characterization of the equilibrium that arises in this context.7
Second, our paper also contributes to the literature analyzing asset pricing anomalies within
the rational expectations equilibrium paradigm. Biais, Bossaerts and Spatt (2008), in a multi-
asset, noisy, dynamic model with overlapping generations show that momentum can arise in
equilibrium. Vayanos and Woolley (2008) present a theory of momentum and reversal based
on delegated portfolio considerations. We add to this literature by showing how momentum
and reversal relate to the ability of the price to track fundamentals compared to investors’
consensus.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature emphasizing the existence of “limits to arbi-
trage.” De Long et. al (1990) show how the risk posed by the existence of an unpredictable
component in the aggregate demand for an asset can crowd-out rational investors, thereby lim-
iting their arbitrage capabilities. In our setup, it is precisely the risk of facing a reversal in
liquidity traders’ positions that tilts informed investors towards accommodating the aggregate
demand. In turn, this effect is responsible for the fact that asset prices can score worse than
consensus in predicting the fundamentals.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the static benchmark,
showing that in this framework the simplistic version of the EMH is satisfied, and the price
scores as well as investors’ consensus at predicting fundamentals. In Section 3 we introduce the
three-period model and in Section 4 we prove equilibrium existence for the case with two trading
rounds and argue that prices may be better or worse estimators of fundamentals whenever,
in the presence of heterogeneous information, investors speculate on short term returns. In
Section 5 we extend our analytical results to the market with three trading rounds, via numerical
simulations. In Sections 6 and 7 we introduce the Keynesian and Hayekian regions, characterize
investors’ behavior and price properties in these regions and draw the implications of our model
for return regularities. The final section provides concluding remarks. Most of the proofs are
7See Vives (2008), Ch. 8 and 9 for a survey of the relevant literature.
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relegated to the appendix.
2 A Static Benchmark
Consider a one-period stock market where a single risky asset with liquidation value v + δ,
and a riskless asset with unitary return are traded by a continuum of risk-averse, informed
investors in the interval [0, 1] together with liquidity traders. We assume that v ∼ N(v¯, τ−1v ),
δ ∼ N(0, τ−1δ ). Investors have CARA preferences (denote with γ the risk-tolerance coefficient)
and maximize the expected utility of their wealth: Wi = (v + δ − p)xi.
8 Prior to the opening
of the market every informed investor i obtains private information on v, receiving a signal
si = v + ǫi, ǫi ∼ N(0, τ
−1
ǫ ), and submits a demand schedule (generalized limit order) to the
market X(si, p) indicating the desired position in the risky asset for each realization of the
equilibrium price.9 Assume that v and ǫi are independent for all i, and that error terms are
also independent across investors. Liquidity traders submit a random demand u (independent of
all other random variables in the model), where u ∼ N(0, τ−1u ). Finally, we make the convention
that, given v, the average signal
∫
1
0
sidi equals v almost surely (i.e. errors cancel out in the
aggregate:
∫
1
0
ǫidi = 0).
10 The random term δ in the liquidation value is orthogonal to all the
random variables in the model and thus denotes the residual uncertainty affecting the final pay
off about which no investor possesses information. This allows to interpret δ as a proxy for the
level of opaqueness that surrounds the value of fundamentals.11
We denote by Ei[Y ], Vari[Y ] the expectation and the variance of the random variable Y
formed by an investor i, conditioning on the private and public information he has: Ei[Y ] =
E[Y |si, p], Vari[Y ] = Var[Y |si, p]. Finally, we denote by E¯[v] =
∫
1
0
Ei[v]di investors’ average
opinion (the “consensus” opinion) about v.
In the above CARA-normal framework, a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) is a set of trades contingent on the information that investors have, {X(si, p) for i ∈ [0, 1]}
and a price functional P (v, u) (measurable in (v, u)), such that the following two conditions
hold:
(I) Investors in [0, 1] optimize
X(si, p) ∈ argmax
xi
E [− exp {−Wi/γ} |si, p] . (1)
(II) The market clears: ∫
1
0
xidi+ u = 0. (2)
8We assume, without loss of generality with CARA preferences, that the non-random endowment of rational
investors is zero.
9The unique equilibrium in linear strategies of this model is symmetric.
10See Section 3.1 in the Technical Appendix of Vives (2008) for a justification of the convention.
11 For example, the component v relates to the “traditional” business of the firm, so that an analyst or an
expert can obtain information about it. The component δ, instead, originates from decisions and actions that
insiders make and regarding which the market is totally clueless.
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Given the above definition, it is easy to verify that a unique, symmetric equilibrium in
linear strategies exists in the class of equilibria with a price functional of the form P (v, u) (see,
e.g. Admati (1985), Vives (2008)). The equilibrium strategy of an investor i is given by
X(si, p) =
a
αE
(Ei[v]− p),
where
a =
γτǫ
1 + κ
, (3)
denotes the responsiveness to private information, κ ≡ τ−1δ τi, τi ≡ (Vari[v])
−1, and αE = τǫ/τi
is the optimal statistical (Bayesian) weight to private information.12 Intuitively, investors have
a private signal about v, but the liquidation value also features a random term δ about which
they are uninformed. The larger is τ−1δ (and thus κ), the less relevant is investors’ private
information to predict v + δ. Imposing market clearing the equilibrium price is given by
p = E¯[v] +
αE
a
u. (4)
We will use the above framework to investigate conditions under which the ability of the
equilibrium price to track the fundamentals potentially differs from that of investors’ consensus.
That is whether Cov[p, v] differs from Cov[E¯[v], v]. In view of (4), it is easy to see that in a
static market both covariances are equal. Indeed, as liquidity trades are orthogonal to the
ex-post liquidation value,
Cov[p, v] = Cov
[
E¯[v] +
αE
a
u, v
]
= Cov
[
E¯[v], v
]
. (5)
A simplistic version of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) would say that competition
among rational investors will drive prices to be centered around the consensus estimate of the
underlying value, given available information. In view of (4) and (5), we can therefore conclude
that in a static setup the equilibrium price satisfies the simplistic version of the EMH, thereby
providing as good a forecast of the ex-post liquidation value as investors’ consensus.
Rearranging (4) we obtain
p = αP
(
v +
u
a
)
+ (1− αP )E[v|p], (6)
where
αP =
a(1 + κ)
γτi
, (7)
captures the weight assigned by the price to the noisy signal coming from the aggregate demand.
The above comparison can then be given two alternative, equivalent representations:
12The responsiveness to private information is given by the unique, positive real solution to the cubic φ(a) =
a3τu+a(τv+τǫ+τδ)−γτδτǫ = 0. To prove uniqueness note that φ(0) = −γτδτǫ < 0, φ(γτǫ) = a(a
2τu+τv+τǫ) > 0,
implying that a real solution a∗ exists in the interval (0, γτǫ). Finally, since φ
′(a)|a=a∗ > 0, the result follows.
7
Lemma 1. In the static market, the following three conditions are equivalent:
Cov[p, v] < Cov
[
E¯[v], v
]
(8)
αP < αE (9)
|E [p− v|v]| >
∣∣E [E¯[v]− v|v]∣∣ . (10)
Proof.
Owing to normality, Ei[v] represents an investor i’s best predictor of the liquidation value
and can be expressed as a weighted average of the investor’s private and public information:
Ei[v] = αEsi + (1− αE)E[v|p].
Furthermore, due to our convention:
E¯[v] = αEv + (1− αE)E[v|p]. (11)
Using (6), and computing the relevant covariance we obtain:
Cov[p, v] = Cov
[
αP
(
v +
θ
a
)
+ (1− αP )E[v|p], v
]
= αPCov[v, v] + (1− αP )Cov [v, E[v|p]]
= αP
1
τv
+ (1− αP )
(
1
τv
−
1
τ
)
, (12)
where τ ≡ Var[v|p]−1 = τv+a
2τu. Similarly, using (11) we can compute the covariance between
the consensus opinion and the fundamentals:
Cov
[
E¯[v], v
]
= αE
1
τv
+ (1− αE)
(
1
τv
−
1
τ
)
, (13)
Subtracting (13) from (12) yields
Cov
[
p− E¯[v], v
]
=
αP − αE
τ
, (14)
which implies that Cov[p, v] differs from Cov[E¯[v], v] whenever the weight assigned by the price
to private information (αP ) differs from the optimal statistical weight (αE). Finally, using once
again (6) and (11) we have
p− v = (1− αP )(E[v|p]− v) + αP
1
a
u, and E¯[v]− v = (1− αE)(E[v|p]− v),
implying
E[p− v|v] = (1− αP )(E[E[v|p]|v]− v), and E
[
E¯[v]− v|v
]
= (1− αE)(E[E[v|p]|v]− v),
and from these equations the equivalence between (9) and (10) follows.
✷
We thus see that the covariance condition (8) is equivalent to the optimal statistical weight
on private information (αE) differing from the weight that the price assigns to the noisy sig-
nal about the private information contained in the aggregate demand (αP ). This is in turn
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equivalent to say that the price is either systematically farther away from (closer to) the funda-
mentals compared to consensus: |E[p− v|v]| > |E[E¯[v]− v|v]| (|E[p− v|v]| < |E[E¯[v]− v|v]), a
condition similar to the one used by Allen et al. (2006) to analyze the impact of Higher Order
Expectations on asset prices.
From the definition of αP and αE, we can verify that
αP = αE ⇔ a =
γτǫ
1 + κ
,
which, given (3), is clearly satisfied. Therefore, we can reinterpret our previous conclusion
and say that in a static market the price (i) assigns the optimal statistical weight to the
fundamentals, (ii) is as farther away from the fundamentals as investors’ consensus, and (iii)
the simplistic version of the EMH is satisfied.13
Remark 1. The model introduced above captures the idea that, collectively taken, rational
investors do not know the ex-post liquidation value and is therefore qualitatively equivalent to
a market in which investors receive a signal with a common error term (like the one studied by
Grundy and McNichols (1989)). To see this, maintaining the informational assumptions of our
model, suppose that the ex-post liquidation value is given by v whereas investor i receives a
signal si = v+δ+ǫi. Then, it is easy to see that in this model there exists a unique equilibrium
in linear strategies in which X(si, p) = (a/αE)(Ei[v]− p).
14
✷
Remark 2. In the paper we refer to u as the demand of liquidity traders. Those are akin to
investors who receive a shock to their endowment and use the market to optimally hedge against
such a shock. It is worth noting that even in a static model the presence of such hedgers may
generate multiplicity of linear partially revealing equilibria (see, e.g., Ganguli and Yang (2009)
and Manzano and Vives (2010)). This would further complicate the analysis of the dynamic
market that we carry out in the following sections.
Note, however, that our specification for the demand of liquidity traders is consistent with
the following model. Replace liquidity traders with a measure 1 sector of risk-averse, compet-
itive hedgers who receive a random shock to their endowment. A hedger i receives a shock
ui = u+ ηi where ηi is a normally distributed white-noise error, uncorrelated with all the other
random variables in the model. If we denote by γU the risk-tolerance of hedgers, then letting
γU → 0 implies that each hedger gets rid of ui in the market place. Owing to the convention
that
∫
1
0
ηidi = 0, a.s., this in turn implies that the position hedgers hold is given by
∫
1
0
uidi = u,
yielding the random component of the aggregate demand that we assume in our model. This
13If E[u] is non null, e.g. if E[u] = u¯ > 0, we have to replace the price p by the price net of the expected
liquidity trades component pˆ = p− u¯Vari[v+ δ]/γ. Using this definition it is immediate to verify that also when
u¯ > 0, αP = αE .
14In this model αE ≡ ((τǫ+ a
2τu)τv + τδ(τǫ+ a
2τu+ τv))
−1τδτǫ, and a is the unique real solution to the cubic
ϕ(a) ≡ a3τu+a(τδ+τǫ)−γτδτǫ = 0. As in our model, a ∈ (0, γτǫ). With an improper prior about the liquidation
value, τv = 0 and the two models yield exactly the same result. When τv > 0, in the model with a common error
in the signal, investors’ responsiveness to private information is always higher than in the model considered here.
To see this note that a is given by the unique solution to φ(a) = a3τu+a(τv+τǫ+τδ)−γτδτǫ = 0, whereas in the
presence of a common error in the signal it is given by the solution to ϕ(a) ≡ a3τu+a(τǫ+ τδ)−γτδτǫ = 0. Now
φ(0) = ϕ(0) = −γτδτǫ < 0, and φ
′(0) = τv+τǫ+τδ > ϕ
′(0) = τǫ+τδ, which together with φ
′′(a) = ϕ′′(a) = 6aτu,
implies that the unique solution to φ(a) = 0 always lays to the left of the unique solution to ϕ(a) = 0.
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is in line with Medrano and Vives (2004), who argue that upon receiving a shock to their
endowment, infinitely risk-averse hedgers unwind their exposure to the market, yielding the
random component of the aggregate demand for the stock that characterizes the model with
noise traders. ✷
In the following sections we will argue that in a dynamic market, long term investors often
engage in speculating on short-run price movements, so that their strategies depart from the
solution of the static setup. This in turn implies that the simplistic version of the EMH fails
to hold, and prices can score better (or worse) than consensus in forecasting the fundamentals.
3 A Three-Period Framework
Consider now a three-period extension of the market analyzed in the previous section. We
assume that any investor i ∈ [0, 1] has CARA preferences and maximizes the expected utility of
his final wealthWi3 = (v+δ−p3)xi3+
∑
2
n=1(pn+1−pn)xin.
15 The random term δ is independent
of all the random variables in the model. In period n an informed investor i receives a signal
sin = v + ǫin, where ǫin ∼ N(0, τ
−1
ǫn ), v and ǫin are independent for all i, n and error terms
are also independent both across time periods and investors. Denote with sni ≡ {sit}
n
t=1 and
pn ≡ {pt}
n
t=1, respectively, the sequence of private signals and prices an investor observes at
time n. It follows from Gaussian theory that the statistic s˜in = (
∑n
t=1 τǫt)
−1(
∑n
t=1 τǫtsit) is
sufficient for the sequence sni in the estimation of v.
The stock of liquidity trades is assumed to follow an AR(1) process: θn = βθn−1+un, where
un ∼ N(0, τ
−1
u ) is orthogonal to θn−1, and β ∈ [0, 1]. To interpret, suppose β < 1, then at
any period n > 1 market clearing involves the n− 1-th and n-th period aggregate demands of
informed investors (respectively, xn−1 ≡
∫
1
0
xin−1di, and xn ≡
∫
1
0
xindi), a fraction 1− β of the
demand coming from the n−1-th generation of liquidity traders who revert their positions, and
the demand of the new generation of liquidity traders. Considering the equilibrium conditions
for the first two trading dates, and letting ∆x2 ≡ x2 − x1, ∆θ2 ≡ θ2 − θ1 = u2 + (β − 1)θ1, this
implies
x1 + θ1 = 0
∆x2 +∆θ2 = 0⇔ x2 + βθ1 + u2 = 0.
Thus, assuming that liquidity trading follows an AR(1) process allows to take into account
the possibility that only part of the trades initiated by liquidity traders at time n actually
reverts at time n + 1. The lower (higher) is β, the higher (lower) is the fraction of period n
liquidity traders who will (will not) revert their positions at time n + 1, and thus won’t (will)
be in the market at time n + 1. Equivalently, for 0 ≤ β < 1, a high, positive demand from
liquidity traders at time n is unlikely to show up with the same intensity at time n+1, implying
15We assume, as before without loss of generality, that the non-random endowment of investors is zero.
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that Cov[∆θn,∆θn+1] < 0.
16 Intuitively, a low β is likely to occur when the time between two
consecutive trades is large. Conversely, a high β depicts a situation in which the time between
two consecutive transactions is small, so that investors make repeated use of the market to
satisfy their trading needs.17
Remark 3. In line with Remark 2 in the dynamic case considered here it is also possible to
show that that the specification for the demand coming from liquidity traders is consistent with
a model in which the risk aversion of rational hedgers grows unboundedly. ✷
Informed investors submit a demand schedule (generalized limit order) to the market
Xn(s˜in, p
n−1, pn) indicating the desired position in the risky asset for each realization of the
equilibrium price. We will restrict attention to linear Perfect Bayesian equilibria in which in
period n an investor trades according to Xn(s˜in, p
n) = ans˜in − ϕn(p
n), where ϕn(·) is a linear
function of the price sequence pn. Note that this equilibrium will be symmetric given the sym-
metry in the preferences of the traders and in the information structure. Let us denote with zn
the intercept of the n-th period net aggregate demand
∫
1
0
∆xindi+un, where ∆xin = xin−xin−1.
The random variable zn ≡ ∆anv + un represents the informational addition brought about by
the n-th period trading round, and can thus be interpreted as the informational content of the
n-th period order-flow (where, with a slight abuse of notation, we set ∆an ≡ an − βan−1).
Extending the notation adopted in the previous section, we denote by Ein[Y ] = E[Y |s
n
i , p
n],
En[Y ] = E[Y |p
n] (Varin[Y ] = Var[Y |s
n
i , p
n], Varn[Y ] = Var[Y |p
n]), respectively the expectation
(variance) of the random variable Y formed by an investor conditioning on the private and public
information he has at time n, and that obtained conditioning on public information only. We
also denote by τn ≡ (Varn[v])
−1, and by τin ≡ (Varin[v])
−1. Finally, αEn =
∑n
t=1 τǫt/τin is the
optimal statistical weight to private information at time n, and we make the convention that,
given v, at any time n the average signal
∫
1
0
sindi equals v almost surely (i.e. errors cancel out
in the aggregate:
∫
1
0
ǫindi = 0).
4 The Two-Period Market
In this section we restrict attention to the case with two trading periods. This allows us to
provide a fully analytical characterization of the market with heterogeneous information.
16Alternatively, the AR(1) assumption for liquidity traders’ demand can be interpreted as a way to parsimo-
niously model the existence of a positive feedback in these traders’ strategies. To see this, consider a 2-period
version of our model, then for β > 0, Corr[θ2, θ1] = β/(1 + β
2)1/2 > 0. For two normal random variables,
positive correlation is equivalent to the monotone likelihood ratio property. Therefore, we can conclude that if
β > 0 the probability of observing a higher θ2 increases in θ1.
17The literature that has dealt with dynamic trading models featuring an AR(1) process for liquidity posits
relatively high values for β. For example, in their analysis of a dynamic FX market, Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2006) model the aggregate exposure to the exchange rate as an AR(1) process and in their numerical simulations
assume β = 0.8 (Table 1, p. 564). This assumption is somehow validated by empirical analysis. In a recent
paper, Easley et al. (2008) analyze the order arrival process using the daily number of buys and sell orders
for 16 stocks over a 15-year time period. Their findings point to a highly persistent process for uninformed
investors.
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4.1 The Equilibrium
Suppose N = 2. The following proposition characterizes equilibrium prices and strategies:
Proposition 1. Let
∑n
t=1 τǫt > 0, there exists a linear equilibrium of the 2-period market in
which
pn = αPn
(
v +
θn
an
)
+ (1− αPn)En[v], n = 1, 2, (15)
where θn = un + βθn−1. An investor’s first period strategy is given by:
X1(si1, z1) =
a1
αE1
(Ei1[v]− p1) +
αP1 − αE1
αE1
a1
αP1
(p1 − E1[v]), (16)
while at time 2:
X2(s˜i2, z
2) =
a2
αE2
(Ei2[v]− p2), (17)
where αP2 = αE2 , a2 = (1 + κ)
−1
∑
2
t=1 τǫt , κ ≡ τ
−1
δ τi2, and expressions for a1 > 0 and αP1 > 0
are provided in the appendix (see equations (A.49), (A.50)).
Proposition 1 extends Vives (1995), restating a result due to He and Wang (1995), providing
an alternative, constructive proof. According to (15), at period n the equilibrium price is a
weighted average of the market expectation about the fundamentals v, and a monotone trans-
formation of the n-th period aggregate demand intercept. A straightforward rearrangement
of (15) yields
pn − En[v] =
αPn
an
(an (v − En[v]) + θn) (18)
= ΛnEn[θn],
where Λn ≡ αPn/an. According to (18), the discrepancy between pn and En[v] is due to the
contribution that liquidity traders are expected to give to the n-th period aggregate demand.18
Thus, Λn is a measure of market depth. The smaller is Λn and the smaller is the anticipated
(and realized) contribution that the stock of liquidity trading gives to the aggregate demand
and to the price.
Substituting (18) into (16), we obtain
X1(si1, z1) =
a1
αE1
(Ei1[v]− p1) +
αP1 − αE1
αE1
E1[θ1].
Thus, an investor’s first period strategy is the sum of two components. The first component
captures the investor’s activity based on his private estimation of the difference between the
fundamentals and the first period equilibrium price. This can be considered as “long-term”
18The expression for E1[θ1] in (18) follows immediately from the fact that
a1v + θ1 ≡ E1 [a1v + θ1]
= a1E1[v] + E1[θ1].
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speculative trading, aimed at profiting from the liquidation value of the asset. The second
component captures the investor’s activity based on the extraction of order flow, i.e. public,
information. This trading is instead aimed at exploiting short-run movements in the asset price
determined by the evolution of the future aggregate demand. Upon observing this information,
and depending on the sign of the difference αP1 − αE1 , investors engage either in “market
making” (when αP1 − αE1 < 0, thereby accommodating the aggregate demand) or in “trend
chasing” (when αP1 − αE1 > 0, thus following the market).
19
To fix ideas, consider the following example. Suppose that E1[θ1] > 0. An investor’s
reaction to this observation depends on whether he believes it to be driven by liquidity trades
or fundamentals information. Indeed,
E1[θ1] = a1(v − E1[v]) + θ1. (19)
Hence, E1[θ1] > 0 can either signal a short-term demand pressure coming from liquidity traders
(θ1 > 0) or rather a fundamental value realization that is above public expectation (v > E1[v]).
In the former (latter) case, the forward looking attitude implied by rational behavior, would
advise the investor to accommodate (join) the aggregate demand in the expectation of a future
price reversion (further increase).20 Suppose αP1 < αE1 , then informed investors count on the
reversal of liquidity traders’ demand in the next period and take the other side of the market,
acting as market makers. They thus short the asset expecting to buy it back in the future at
a lower price. If, on the other hand, αP1 > αE1 , informed investors anticipate that the role of
“positive” fundamentals information looms large in the n-th period aggregate demand and that
this is most likely affecting the sign of E1[θ1]. As a consequence, they buy the asset, expecting
to re sell it once its price has incorporated the positive news, effectively chasing the trend.
Finally, note that according to (17), in the second period investors concentrate in “long term
speculation.” Indeed, at n = 2, investors anticipate that the asset will be liquidated in the next
period and thus that its value will not depend on the information contained in that period’s
aggregate demand. As a consequence, they choose their position only taking into account their
information on the fundamentals, acting like in a static market.
Remark 4. Multiple equilibria may in principle arise. For some parameter values, it is easy
to find different equilibria. For instance, if liquidity trades increments are i.i.d., and investors
only receive private information in the first period (i.e., if β = 1 and τǫ2 = 0), there always
exists an equilibrium where a1 = a2 = (1 + κ)
−1γτǫ1 , whereas for large values of τδ another
equilibrium where a1 = (γτu)
−1(1 + κ + γ2τǫ1τu) > a2 = (1 + κ)
−1γτǫ1 may also arise (in line
with what happens in a model where investors receive a signal containing a common error term
– see Remark 1). The first equilibrium disappears when β < 1. In the absence of residual
uncertainty (i.e., if τ−1δ = 0), κ = 0, and the equilibrium with a1 = a2 = γτǫ1 is unique (see
Section 4.3). ✷
19He and Wang (1995) point out that in a market with long term investors the weights that prices and average
expectations assign to fundamentals can differ.
20In other words, owing to the traditional signal extraction problem, it is entirely possible that the sign of
E1[θ1] is due to the presence of a positive demand coming from informed traders.
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As argued above, the difference αP1−αE1 plays a crucial role in shaping investors’ reactions
to public information and thus their trading behavior. In our static benchmark, on the other
hand, the same difference also determines how “close” the price is to the fundamentals compared
to the average expectations investors hold about it. This fact is also true in a dynamic market.
Indeed, since
E¯n[v] ≡
∫
1
0
Ein[v]di = αEnv + (1− αEn)En[v], (20)
and using (15), a straightforward extension of the argument used in section 2 allows to obtain
the following
Lemma 2. At any linear equilibrium of the 2-period market, the following three conditions
are equivalent:
Cov[pn, v] < Cov
[
E¯n[v], v
]
(21)
αPn < αEn (22)
|E [pn − v|v]| >
∣∣E [E¯n[v]− v|v]∣∣ . (23)
Proof. For the first part of the proof, computing the covariance between pn and v yields
Cov[v, pn] = αPn
1
τv
+ (1− αPn)
(
1
τv
−
1
τn
)
, (24)
and carrying out a similar computation for the time n consensus opinion
Cov
[
E¯n[v], v
]
= αEn
1
τv
+ (1− αEn)
(
1
τv
−
1
τn
)
, (25)
where τn ≡ (Var[v|p
n])−1 = τv + τu
∑n
t=1∆a
2
t . We can now subtract (25) from (24) and obtain
Cov
[
pn − E¯n[v], v
]
=
αPn − αEn
τn
, (26)
implying that whenever the price scores worse than consensus in forecasting the fundamentals,
the weight the former assigns to public information is larger than the optimal statistical weight.
To prove the equivalence between (22) and (23), we use the expressions for the prices and
consensus in the 2-period market (respectively equations (15) and (20)) and obtain
pn − v = (1− αPn)(En[v]− v) + αPn
1
an
θn, and E¯n[v]− v = (1− αEn)(En[v]− v),
implying
E[pn − v|v] = (1− αPn)(E[En[v]|v]− v), and E
[
E¯n[v]− v|v
]
= (1− αEn)(E[En[v]|v]− v),
Thus, if αPn > αEn the price is closer to the fundamentals compared to the consensus opinion,
while the opposite occurs whenever αPn < αEn .
✷
We can now put together the results obtained in Proposition 1 and Lemma 2: if upon
observing the first period aggregate demand investors expect it to be mostly driven by liquidity
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trades, they accommodate the order flow. As a consequence, their behavior drives the price
away from the fundamentals compared to the average market opinion. If, instead, they deem
the aggregate demand to be mostly information driven, they align their short term positions
to those of the market. This, in turn, drives the price closer to the fundamentals, compared to
investors’ average expectations.
Alternatively, when investors speculate on short term returns the first period equilibrium
price and the consensus opinion have different dynamics:
p1 = E¯1[v] +
αP1 − αE1
a1
E1[θ1] +
αE1
a1
θ1. (27)
Indeed, as the price originates from market clearing, it reflects both determinants of investors’
demand, i.e. their long term forecast and their short term speculative activity. Conversely, as
the consensus opinion is only based on investors’ long term expectations, it does not reflect the
impact of short term speculation.
Remark 5. If we use (27) and the fact that according to Lemma 2
Cov[pn − E¯n[v], v] =
αPn − αEn
τn
,
then we can write the first period equilibrium price as follows:
p1 = E¯1[v] +
Cov[p1 − E¯1[v], v]
Var1[v]
E1
[
θ1
a1
]
+ αE1
θ1
a1
.
The above expression is akin to a traditional asset pricing equation in which the asset price loads
on two factors. Since investors are informed about the “long term” fundamentals, it reflects
their consensus view. However, given that predictability induces investors to also speculate on
short term returns, a systematic risk premium is required to compensate them for holding the
expected liquidity stock (scaled by informed investors’ responsiveness to private information)
across trading dates in the presence of differential information. This latter component can be
viewed as a “short term” fundamentals. Note that the coefficient that multiplies
E1
[
θ1
a1
]
,
is like a “beta”:
Cov[p1 − E¯1[v], v]
Var1[v]
,
in that for given conditional precision (or variance, in the denominator), the larger (in absolute
value) the covariance between price departures from consensus and fundamentals, the higher the
risk associated either to liquidity trades or adverse selection that is borne by investors (in fact
according to Proposition 1, in equilibrium these departures signal the presence of short term
trading). Note also that this “beta” can be positive or negative depending on the difference
αP1 − αE1 . ✷
To establish the direction of inequality (23) we thus need to determine what is the force
that drives an investor’s reaction to the information contained in the aggregate demand. Prior
to that we consider a special case of our model in which investors have symmetric information.
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4.2 Symmetric Information and Short Term Speculation
In this section we assume that investors have symmetric information, setting τǫn = 0, for all
n. This considerably simplifies the analysis and allows us to show that in the absence of
private information short term speculation does not lead prices to be systematically closer or
farther away from the fundamentals compared to investors’ average expectations. We start by
characterizing the equilibrium in this setup, and then analyze its properties.
Proposition 2. In the 2-period market with symmetric information, there exists a unique
equilibrium in linear strategies, where prices are given by
pn = v¯ + Λnθn, (28)
where
Λ2 =
1 + κ
γτv
(29)
Λ1 = Λ2
(
1 +
(β − 1)γ2τuτv
1 + κ+ γ2τuτv
)
, (30)
and κ = τv/τδ. Risk averse investors trade according to
Xn(p
n) = −Λ−1n (pn − v¯), n = 1, 2. (31)
When τǫ = 0, at any period n investors have no private signal to use when forming their
position. As a consequence, the aggregate demand only reflects the stock of liquidity trades.
According to (31), this implies that speculators always take the other side of the market, buying
the asset when pn < v¯ ⇔ θn = Λ
−1
n (pn− v¯) < 0, and selling it otherwise. Indeed, in the absence
of private information, risk averse investors face no adverse selection problem when they clear
the market. The discrepancy between the equilibrium price and the unconditional expected
value reflects the risk premium investors demand in order to accommodate the demand of
liquidity traders. Even in the absence of adverse selection risk, in fact, investors anticipate the
possibility that the liquidation value v may be lower (higher) than the price they pay for (at
which they sell) the asset.
If β < 1, in the first period risk averse investors also speculate on short term asset price
movements providing additional order flow accommodation. This can be seen rearranging (31)
in the following way:
X1(p1) = Λ
−1
2 (v¯ − p1)−
(
Λ−11 − Λ
−1
2
)
(p1 − v¯).
As a result, for β ∈ (0, 1), market depth decreases across trading periods:
0 < Λ1 < Λ2,
and it decreases in β in the first period:
∂Λ1
∂β
> 0,
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as one can immediately see from (30). The intuition for these results is that if β < 1, as liquidity
trades’ increments are negatively correlated, prior to the last trading round investors have more
opportunities to unload their risky position. This reduces the risk they bear, and lowers the
impact that the liquidity shock has on the price. If β = 1 liquidity trades’ increments are i.i.d..
Therefore, speculators cannot count on the future reversion in the demand of liquidity traders
and their extra order flow accommodation disappears. As a consequence, depth is constant
across periods: Λ1 = Λ2 = (γτv)
−1(1 + κ).21
As one would intuitively expect, short term speculation arises insofar as investors can map
the partial predictability of liquidity trades’ increments into the anticipation of short term
returns. The following proposition formalizes this intuition:
Corollary 1. In the market with symmetric information, in the first period investors speculate
on short term asset price movements if and only if, provided θ1 > 0 (θ1 < 0), they expect the
next period return to revert: E1[p2 − p1] < 0 (E1[p2 − p1] > 0).
Proof. Using (28) we can easily obtain
En[p2 − p1] = (βΛ2 − Λ1) θn.
Using (30) we then obtain
(βΛ2 − Λ1) θ1 = Λ2(β − 1)
1 + κ
1 + κ+ γ2τuτv
θ1 (32)
= Λ2Λ
−1
1 (β − 1)
1 + κ
1 + κ+ γ2τuτv
(p1 − v¯).
Since for β ∈ [0, 1), the term multiplying θ1 in (32) is negative, E1[p2 − p1] < 0 ⇔ θ1 > 0. If
β = 1 investors do not speculate on short term returns, and Λ1 = Λ2 = (γτv)
−1(1 + κ). This,
in turn, implies that E1[p2 − p1] = 0, proving our claim. ✷
Both in the market with homogeneous information and in the one with heterogeneous in-
formation investors speculate on short term returns. However, while in the latter market this
possibly leads to the fact that prices are worse predictors of the fundamentals compared to
consensus, in the presence of symmetric information this never happens:
Corollary 2. With symmetric information at n = 1, 2, the price is as far away from the
fundamentals as investors’ average expectations.
Proof. According to (28), the equilibrium price can be expressed as the sum of investors’
average expectations and θn which is by assumption orthogonal to v. Hence,
E[pn − v|v] = E[v¯ + Λnθn − v|v] = v¯ − v.
Given that investors do not have private information, the price only reflects θn, and Ein[v] =
E[v] = v¯. Hence,
E
[
E¯n[v]− v|v
]
= v¯ − v.
21This matches the result that He and Wang obtain when looking at the case of homogeneous information
when signal are fully informative on v, i.e. with τǫn →∞.
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Thus E[E¯n[v]− v|v] = E[pn − v|v], which proves our result. ✷
As risk-averse investors have no private information to trade with, their orders do not
impound fundamentals information in the price. As a consequence, as shown in Proposition 2,
at any period n investors are able to extract the realization of liquidity traders’ demand θn
from the observation of the aggregate demand, implying that the price perfectly reflects θn. As
the latter is orthogonal to v, and in the absence of heterogeneous signals E¯n[v] = v¯, both prices
and speculators’ consensus opinion about fundamentals stand at the same “distance” from v.
The last result of this section draws an implication of our analysis for the time series behavior
of returns, showing that returns display reversal if liquidity trades increments are correlated:
Corollary 3. In the first period, returns exhibit reversal if and only if β < 1.
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that Cov[p2−p1, p1− v¯] = Λ1(βΛ2−Λ1)τ
−1
u < 0.
✷
With homogeneous information, reversal occurs because if β < 1 not all the liquidity traders
revert their position in the second period, so that the impact of their demand partially evapo-
rates over time.22
Summarizing, in the model with no private information investors speculate on short term
asset price movements if and only if they can exploit the predictability of future liquidity trades’
increments. However, prices are as far away from fundamentals as the consensus opinion.
Furthermore, corollaries 1 and 3 imply that at any time n = 1, 2, and for all (β, 1/τδ) ∈
[0, 1) × R+ the short term, contrarian strategy based on the realization of θn univocally maps
into return reversal.
4.3 The Effect of Heterogeneous Information
As explained in Section 4.1, the assumption β < 1 implies that liquidity trades’ increments
are negatively correlated, and introduces a mean reverting component in the evolution of the
aggregate demand. In the market with no private information analyzed in Section 4.2, as
the position of liquidity traders is perfectly observable, this leads investors to speculate on
short term returns, providing additional order flow accommodation. When investors have
private signals, the aggregate demand also features a component that reflects fundamentals
information. As a consequence, the stock of liquidity trades cannot be perfectly retrieved, and
informed investors face an adverse selection problem. Thus, when they observe the aggregate
demand, they estimate the stock of liquidity trades and choose the side of the market on which
to stand, based on which component (liquidity shocks or fundamentals information) they trust
will influence the evolution of the future aggregate demand. Mean reversion in liquidity trades
increments pushes investors to take the other side of the market (see Section 4.2). In this
section we will argue that with heterogeneous information, if τ−1δ > 0 investors scale up their
22In the second period, one can check that Cov[v − p2, p2 − p1] = −Λ2(Λ2 + β(βΛ2 − Λ1))τ
−1
u < 0 for all β.
In this case negative covariance always arises because the third period price is exogenous.
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signal responsiveness prior to the last trading round. This, in turn, implies that prior to
the last trading round informed investors are more inclined to attribute a given aggregate
demand realization to the impounding of fundamentals information, and are pushed to follow
the market. Both effects eventually bear on the magnitude of the weight the price assigns to
the fundamentals.
We start by assuming away residual uncertainty. In this case it is possible to show that a
unique equilibrium in linear strategies exists (He and Wang (1995) and Vives (1995)):
Corollary 4. In the absence of residual uncertainty, a unique equilibrium in linear strategies
exists where an = γ(
∑n
t=1 τǫt), and
αP1 = αE1
(
1 + (β − 1)
γτ1τu(γτ1 + βa1)
(1 + γτu∆a2)2τi1 + (γτ1 + βa1)2τu
)
< αE1 , (33)
if and only if β < 1.
According to the above result, if τ−1δ = 0, investors’ responsiveness to private information
matches the static solution and, when β < 1, prices score worse than consensus in predicting
the fundamentals. Intuitively, if τ−1δ = 0, as investors respond to private signals as in a static
market, when β < 1 in the first period the only source of predictability of the future aggregate
demand comes from the mean reverting nature of liquidity traders’ demand. Investors’ short
term behavior is then akin to the one they display in the market with symmetric information.
Thus, upon observing p1 > E1[v]⇔ E1[θ1] > 0 (p1 < E1[v]⇔ E1[θ1] < 0), investors accommo-
date the expected positive demand (supply) of liquidity traders, selling (buying) the asset in the
anticipation of a future price reversion. As these price movements do not reflect fundamentals
information, this drives the price away from the terminal pay off compared to the consensus
opinion.
Corollary 4 argues that, absent residual uncertainty, investors’ sole motive to speculate on
price differences is the possibility to profit from the mean reversion of liquidity trades. This
suggests that shutting down this prediction channel should eliminate any short term speculative
activity:
Corollary 5. In the absence of residual uncertainty, αP1 = αE1 if and only if β = 1.
Proof. This follows immediately by replacing β = 1 in (33). ✷
If τ−1δ = 0, and β = 1, liquidity trades’ increments are i.i.d. and in the first period investors
have no way to exploit the predictability of future periods’ aggregate demand. As a consequence,
they concentrate their trading activity on long term speculation, and αP1 = αE1 .
We now introduce residual uncertainty. In this case, it is possible to prove that:
Corollary 6. In the presence of residual uncertainty, at any linear equilibrium the weight the
price assigns to the fundamentals in the first period is given by
αP1 = αE1 (1 + (βρ1 − 1)Υ1) , (34)
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where
ρ1 =
a1(1 + κ)
γτǫ1
> 1, (35)
and the expressions for a1 > 0 and Υ1 > 0 are provided in the appendix (see equations (A.49)
and (A.51)).
According to (34), residual uncertainty generates an effect that offsets the one that liquidity
trades’ mean reversion has on αP1 . The intuition is as follows. As argued in section 4.1 in the
last trading round agents concentrate on the long term value of the asset, speculating as in a
static market. This implies that their responsiveness to private information is given by
a2 =
γ
∑
2
t=1 τǫt
1 + κ
.
The above expression generalizes (3) and shows that in a static market with residual uncertainty,
the weight investors assign to private information is the risk-tolerance weighted sum of their
private signal precisions, scaled down by a factor 1 + κ, which is larger, the larger is τ−1δ .
Residual uncertainty also affects an investor’s signal responsiveness in the first period, and this
is reflected by the parameter ρ1, which captures the deviation from the long term private signal
responsiveness due to the presence of residual uncertainty (see (35)). As stated in Corollary 6
in the presence of residual uncertainty ρ1 > 1. Thus, in the first period, investors react to their
private signals more aggressively than if they were just about to observe the liquidation value:
a1 >
γτǫ1
1 + κ
.
Indeed, while residual uncertainty makes investors less confident about their signals, the pres-
ence of an additional trading round increases the opportunities to adjust suboptimal positions
prior to liquidation. This, in turn, boosts investors’ reaction to private information compared
to the static solution. Furthermore, this also implies that a given aggregate demand realiza-
tion is more likely to be driven by informed investors, contributing to explain the component
capturing trading based on order flow information in investors’ strategies:
Corollary 7. In the presence of residual uncertainty, at any linear equilibrium in the first
period αP1 < αE1 if and only if βρ1 < 1.
Proof. Follows immediately from (34). ✷
To fix ideas, suppose β = 1 and assume that in the first period investors observe p1 > E1[v]
(i.e., E1[θ1] > 0). Given that the demand of liquidity traders displays no predictable pattern,
a short term position based on shorting the asset in the anticipation of buying it back at a
lower price one period ahead is suboptimal. At the same time, the fact that ρ1 > 1 implies
that informed investors react more aggressively to their private signal than in a static market.
This generates additional informed trading which may be responsible for the observed price
realization. Informed investors thus go long in the asset in the anticipation of a further price
increase in the coming period. If β < 1, the mean reversion effect of liquidity trades kicks in
and investors’ decisions as to the side of the market in which to position themselves needs to
trade off this latter pattern against the one driven by fundamentals information.
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5 The Three-Period Market
In this section we extend our analysis to the case with three trading dates. This allows to check
the robustness of our findings and, as we argue in Section 7, use our model to study return
regularities with endogenous prices.
In the model with three trading dates, the equilibrium has the same form of the two-period
case. With symmetric information, natural extensions of Proposition 2, and Corollaries 1, 2,
and 3 hold. In particular, in the appendix (see the proof of Proposition A.2) we show that
Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] =
(
βΛ3 − Λ2
τu
)(
Λ2
(
1 + β2
)
− βΛ1
)
< 0⇔ β < 1. (36)
In the model with heterogeneous information when τ−1δ > 0, we are unable to provide an
existence proof and have to resort to numerical simulations to study the properties of the model.
Numerical simulations were conducted assuming different patterns of private information ar-
rival. In particular, we assumed that investors receive information of a constant precision at
every trading round (so that τǫn = τǫ > 0, for all n), that private information only arrives in
the first two periods (i.e., τǫ1 = τǫ2 > 0, while τǫ3 = 0), and that private information is only
received in the first period (i.e., τǫ1 > 0, while τǫn = 0 for n = 2, 3). The values of the chosen
parameters are as follows: τv, τu, τǫn ∈ {1, 4}, γ ∈ {1/4, 1/2, 1}, and β ∈ {0, 0.001, 0.002, . . . , 1},
τ−1δ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 5}, for each pattern of private information arrival. While the values of the
risk tolerance coefficient reflect realistic assumptions, the values of the precisions have been
chosen to verify the robustness of our conclusions. As we argue in Remark 4, with residual
uncertainty, multiple equilibria can arise, but we find that the qualitative properties of the
model do not change across equilibria.23
More in detail (see Proposition A.1), for n = 1, 2, 3, prices satisfy (15), investors’ strategies
in the first two periods are given by
Xn(s˜in, z
n) =
an
αEn
(Ein[v]− pn) +
αPn − αEn
αEn
En[θn],
whereas in the third period they are akin to those of the static market. Furthermore, a 3-
period extension of Corollary 2 holds, while the weights assigned by prices to aggregate private
information in the first two periods are given by
αP1 = αE1
(
1 + (βρ1 − ρ2)Υ
1
1 + (βρ2 − 1)Υ
2
1
)
(37)
αP2 = αE2
(
1 + (βρ2 − 1)Υ
1
2
)
, (38)
where
ρn =
an(1 + κ)
γ
∑n
t=1 τǫt
, (39)
κ = τ−1δ τi3, and the expressions for Υ
k
n, an are provided in the appendix for k, n ∈ {1, 2} (see
equations (A.26), (A.44), (A.45), and (A.6), (A.21), (A.46), respectively). A straightforward
23Simulations were conducted using Mathematica. Additional simulations have been done to extend the space
of parameter values for the precisions, assuming τv, τu, τǫn ∈ {.1, .2, . . . , 2}, β ∈ {0, .1, . . . , 1} and γ ∈ {1, 3},
τδ ∈ {1, 10}.
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extension of Proposition 1 shows that the parameter Υ12 is positive while numerical simulations
suggest that Υ11 > 0 and Υ
2
1 > 0, and that ρ1 ≥ ρ2 > 1.
24 Finally, when τ−1δ = 0, an extension
of Corollary (4) allows us to prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the 3-period
case:
Corollary 8. When N = 3 and τ−1δ = 0, there exists a unique equilibrium in linear strategies
where at any period n = 1, 2, (a) an = γ
∑n
t=1 τǫt ; (b) αPn < αEn if and only if β < 1; (c)
αPn = αEn if and only if β = 1.
6 Prices and Consensus Opinion: Keynes vs. Hayek
Summarizing the results we obtained in the previous sections (analytically and numerically),
the systematic discrepancy between prices and the consensus opinion in the estimation of the
fundamentals, depends on the joint impact that liquidity trades’ mean reversion and informed
investors’ response to private information have on short term speculative activity. According
to Corollary 4, lacking residual uncertainty, liquidity trades’ mean reversion pushes informed
investors to act as market makers. This pulls the price away from the fundamentals compared
to the average market opinion. When residual uncertainty is introduced, Corollary 7 together
with our numerical results imply that the decision to “make” the market or “chase” the trend
arises as a solution to the trade off between the strength of liquidity trades’ mean reversion
and that of informed investors’ response to private information. Finally, when liquidity trades’
increments are i.i.d., Corollaries 5 and 8 respectively imply that lacking residual uncertainty
investors concentrate on long term speculation only, while introducing residual uncertainty they
tend to chase the market. This, in turn, leads to a price that is either as far away from, or
closer to the fundamentals compared to investors’ average opinion. Table 1 summarizes this
discussion.
Liquidity trades’ persistence
β = 0 0 < β < 1 β = 1
Residual uncertainty
τ−1δ = 0 αPn < αEn αPn < αEn αPn = αEn
τ−1δ > 0 αPn < αEn αPn ≶ αEn αPn > αEn
Table 1: A summary of the results for n = 1, 2.
Our summary suggests that in both periods and for τ−1δ ≥ 0, there must exist a β such that
αPn = αEn , and investors forgo short term speculation. Our numerical simulations confirm this
insight as shown in figures 1 and 2. The figures plot the locus Ωn ≡ {(β, 1/τδ) ∈ [0, 1]×R+|αPn =
24This is consistent with our intuition for ρ1 > 1 in Section 4.3. Indeed, the more extra trading dates an
investors has, the more opportunities he has to correct a speculative position based on private information.
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Ω1 with τv = 1, τu = 1, τǫn = 1, for n = 1, 2, 3.
τ−1δ
Figure 1: The Keynesian and Hayekian regions for n = 1 with “constant” arrival of information:
τǫn = τǫ for n = 1, 2, 3. The bold, dotted, and thin curves are associated respectively to γ = 1,
γ = 1/2, and γ = 1/4. The area to the left of each curve identifies the set of parameter values
where prices score worse than consensus at predicting the fundamentals (i.e., the Keynesian
region). Conversely, the area to the right of each curve identifies the set of parameter values
for which the opposite occurs (the Hayekian region).
αEn}, n = 1, 2, assuming that investors receive a private signal in every trading period of
the same precision. At any period n, the set Ωn divides the parameter space (β, 1/τδ) into a
Keynesian region (to the left of the locus) where prices are worse predictors of the fundamentals
compared to consensus, and a Hayekian region (the rest) where the opposite occurs. Formally,
the Keynesian region is thus given by the set
{(β, 1/τδ) ∈ [0, 1]× R+|αPn < αEn , n = 1, 2}.
Conversely, the Hayekian region is given by
{(β, 1/τδ) ∈ [0, 1]× R+|αPn > αEn , n = 1, 2}.
With no residual uncertainty (τ−1δ = 0) and i.i.d. liquidity trades increments (β = 1), Ωn =
(1, 0) (Corollaries 5 and 8). The introduction of residual uncertainty, on the other hand, may
have a non-monotone effect on Ωn. Observing the figures for small (large) values of τ
−1
δ the
Hayekian region widens (shrinks). This is especially true for high levels of risk tolerance. The
intuition is as follows. For small levels of residual uncertainty, the fact that speculators can
re trade in a dynamic market has a first order impact on ρn as the possibility to readjust
one’s position more than compensates for the increase in risk due to the augmented residual
uncertainty over the liquidation value. As τ−1δ grows larger, the possibility to retrade has an
increasingly weaker effect on an investor’s dynamic responsiveness, as private signals become
less and less relevant to forecast the fundamentals. Investors thus scale back their responsiveness
and more liquidity trades persistence is needed to make investors forgo short term speculation.25
25According to the figures above as τ−1δ grows unboundedly investors’ private signal responsiveness shrinks
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Ω2 with τv = 1, τu = 1, τǫn = 1, for n = 1, 2, 3.
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Figure 2: The Keynesian and Hayekian regions for n = 2 with “constant” arrival of information:
τǫn = τǫ for n = 1, 2, 3. The bold, dotted, and thin curves are associated respectively to γ = 1,
γ = 1/2, and γ = 1/4. The area to the left of each curve identifies the set of parameter
values for which the price scores worse than consensus at predicting the fundamentals (i.e., the
Keynesian region). Conversely, the area to the right of each curve identifies the set of parameter
values for which the opposite occurs (the Hayekian region).
According to our simulations, when τǫn = τǫ > 0 for all n, at any trading period the
Hayekian (Keynesian) region widens (shrinks) whenever the impact of investors’ response to
private information on aggregate demand realizations is strong. This occurs for large values of γ,
τǫ, and τu. When, on the other hand, τv is large, investors enter the market with sufficiently good
prior information, and the trading process is unlikely to have a strong informational impact
on the price. In this case, the Hayekian (Keynesian) region shrinks (widens). Interestingly,
when investors only receive information in the first and second period we find that αP2 < αE2 .
Similarly, our numerical simulations show that if τǫ2 = 0, the same happens in the first period
as well, implying that the Hayekian region disappears in both period 1 and 2, and Ωn =
{(1, τ−1δ ), for τ
−1
δ > 0}. The intuition is as follows: from our previous analysis the reason why
informed investors may want to side with the market is that they believe that fundamentals
information drives the aggregate demand realization. However, with this pattern of information
arrival, investors do not receive any new signal after the first (or second) trading round. As
a consequence, in the presence of a mean reverting demand from liquidity traders, siding with
the market exposes informed investors to a considerable risk of trading in the expectation of a
price increase (decrease) in the second and third period and instead being faced with a price
decrease (increase).26
but the Hayekian region does not disappear. In the 2-period model it is easy to see that when τ−1δ → ∞,
Ω1 becomes a constant. Indeed, in this case Ω1 = {(β, 1/τδ) ∈ [0, 1] × R|βρ1 = 1}, and limτ−1
δ
→∞ ρ1 =
(τv + τǫ1)
−1(τv + τǫ1 + τǫ2) > 1 is a constant that only depends on deep parameters. Therefore, βρ1 = 1 can
be explicitly solved, yielding β = (τv + τǫ1 + τǫ2)
−1(τv + τǫ1) < 1. In the three-period model our numerical
simulations show that a similar effect is at work.
26The figures in the text refer to a set of numerical simulations that were conducted assuming τv, τu, τǫn ∈
{1, 4}, γ ∈ {1/4, 1/2, 1}, and β ∈ {0, 0.001, 0.002, . . . , 1}, τ−1δ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 5}, for each pattern of private
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According to the above discussion, the set Ωn captures the set of deep parameter values
granting the existence of an equilibrium in which investors only focus on an asset long-term
prospects. The exclusive focus on an asset long term prospects arises either in the absence of
any systematic pattern in the evolution of the aggregate demand (as argued in Corollaries 5
and 8) or when the forces backing trend chasing are exactly offset by those supporting market
making (as shown in figures 1 and 2). In both cases, along the region Ωn, long term investors can
only devote their attention to forecasting the fundamentals, shying away from the exploitation
of the profits generated by short-term price movements. As a consequence, the price ends up
being as close to the fundamentals as the market average opinion and the simplistic version of
the EMH holds.
Corollary 1 argues that in the presence of symmetric information it is possible to map
observed price departures from the public expectation at a given period n (i.e., pn − En[v]),
into a position which is coherent with investors’ expectations about the future evolution of the
market price. The following corollary shows that an equivalent result also holds in the market
with heterogeneous information, characterizing the consensus opinion about the evolution of
future prices in the Hayekian and Keynesian regions:
Corollary 9. In the presence of residual uncertainty, at any linear equilibrium
E[p2 − E2[v]|v] > 0⇔ E
[
E¯2[p3 − p2]|v
]
> 0,
if and only if αP2 > αE2 . If τ
−1
δ = 0
E[pn − En[v]|v] > 0⇔ E
[
E¯n[pn+1 − pn]|v
]
< 0.
Thus, in the Hayekian (Keynesian) region, a systematic positive price departure from the
public expectation about the fundamentals at time 2 “generates” the consensus opinion that
prices will systematically further rise (decrease) in the third period. In the first period numerical
simulations confirm that a similar result holds: E[p1 − E1[v]|v] > 0 ⇔ E[E¯1[p2 − p1]|v] > 0.
If τ−1δ = 0 informed investors’ response to their private information matches that of the static
solution. Hence, provided β < 1, only the Keynesian equilibrium can arise and a systematic
positive discrepancy between prices and public expectations creates the consensus opinion that
prices will systematically revert. Finally, along the region Ωn, the market consensus opinion is
that the next period price won’t change in any systematic way. As a consequence, E[E¯n[pn+1−
pn]|v] = 0, and investors concentrate on the asset long term prospects.
7 Reversal and Momentum
A vast empirical literature has evidenced the existence of return predictability based on a
stock’s past performance. DeBondt and Thaler (1986) document a “reversal” effect, whereby
stocks with low past returns (losers) tend to outperform stocks with high past returns (win-
ners) over medium/long future horizons. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), instead, document a
information arrival.
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“momentum” effect, showing that recent past winners tend to outperform recent past losers
in the following near future.27 At a theoretical level, it has proved difficult to reproduce these
anomalies within the context of models with rational investors.28 In contrast, a large number
of theories have been proposed in the behavioral finance literature which allow for departures
from full rationality and deliver return anomalies.29
In our framework, as we argued in Section 4.2, when investors have no private information,
liquidity trades’ low persistence implies that returns are negatively correlated, and thus exhibit
reversal. In this section we consider the 3-period extension of the model with heterogeneous
information summarized in Section 5, and analyze its implications for returns’ correlation. The
introduction of a strongly persistent factor affecting asset prices (i.e., fundamentals information)
contrasts the impact of the transient component represented by the stock of liquidity trades.
As a consequence, and except for the case in which β = 0, momentum and reversal can arise
in both the Keynesian and the Hayekian equilibrium.
Using (18), we concentrate on the covariance between second and third period returns, as
this fully depends on endogenous prices:
Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] = Cov [E3[v]− E1[v],Λ3E3[θ3]− Λ1E1[θ1]] (40)
+Cov [Λ2E2 [θ2]− Λ1E1[θ1],Λ3E3[θ3]− Λ2E2[θ2]] .
Explicitly computing the covariances in (40) and rearranging yields:
Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] =
(
βΛ3 − Λ2
τu
)
× (41)(
Λ2
(
1 + β2
)
− βΛ1 +
a2τu(1− αP2)
τ2
−
βa1τu(1− αP1)
τ1
)
.
The latter expression shows that in a market with heterogeneous information the covariance of
returns is generated by two effects. The first one is captured by(
βΛ3 − Λ2
τu
)(
Λ2
(
1 + β2
)
− βΛ1
)
,
27More in detail, DeBondt and Thaler (1986) classify all the NYSE-traded stocks according to their past
three-year return in relation to the corresponding market average in the period spanning January 1926 to
December 1982 in stocks that outperform the market (“winners”) and stocks that underperform it (“losers”).
According to their results, in the following three years, portfolios of losers outperform the market by 19.6% on
average while portfolios of winners underperform the market by 5% on average. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993),
classify NYSE stocks over the period from January 1963 to December 1989 according to their past six-month
returns. Their results show that the top prior winners tend to outperform the worst prior losers by an average
of 10% on an annual basis. Research on momentum and reversal is extensive (see Vayanos and Woolley (2008)
and Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2008) for a survey of recent contributions).
28Notable exceptions are Biais, Bossaerts and Spatt (2008) and Vayanos and Woolley (2010).
29The behavioral finance literature on return anomalies is vast. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) show
that if investors incorrectly interpret the probability law that drives an asset earning (which in reality follows a
random walk), returns display predictable patterns. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) show that
when investors suffer from overconfidence about the precision of their private signals and biased self-attribution,
both reversal and momentum patterns in return arise. Hong and Stein (1999) model a market with two categories
of investors: “newswatchers,” who make decisions only based on private information, and “momentum traders,”
who instead invest only using heuristic rules based on public signals. If the process through which information
diffuses across the newswatchers population is slow, both reversal and momentum can arise. See Barberis and
Thaler (2003) for a comprehensive survey of the literature.
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which coincides with the expression given for the third period returns’ covariance in the model
with homogeneous information (see equation (36)). As we argued in Section 4.2, this compo-
nent reflects the impact of the liquidity shocks affecting the first and second period aggregate
demand. The second component is given by(
βΛ3 − Λ2
τu
)(
a2τu(1− αP2)
τ2
−
βa1τu(1− αP1)
τ1
)
,
and captures the impact of the fundamental information shocks affecting the first and second
period aggregate demand.
Inspection of (41) shows that if β = 0, then Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] < 0, implying that
if liquidity trades’ increments are strongly negatively correlated (i.e., the stock of liquidity
trades is transient, and i.i.d), returns can only exhibit reversal. Hence, when β = 0 equilibria
are Keynesian (in that the price is a worse predictor of the liquidation value compared to
consensus) and display negative returns’ autocorrelation.
As β increases away from zero, depending on the patterns of private information arrival,
momentum can arise. To see this, we start by assuming away residual uncertainty and set
β = 1, so that any pattern in the correlation of returns must depend on the time distribution
of private information. In this situation, as argued in Corollaries 5 and 8, the equilibrium is
unique and we have αPn = αEn = τ
−1
in
∑n
t=1 τǫt , an = γ
∑n
t=1 τǫt , and Λn = 1/γτin, implying that,
provided investors receive information at all trading dates, and differently from what happens
in the market with homogeneous information, Λn+1 < Λn.
30 As a consequence, Λ3 < Λ2 and,
similarly to the case with homogeneous information, the impact of a given liquidity shock
“evaporates” across trading periods. Note, however, that as now market depth depends on the
patterns of information arrival, the presence of heterogeneous information makes it possible for
the impact of the first period liquidity shock to overpower that of the liquidity shock arriving
in the second period. Indeed, as one can verify:
Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] > 0⇔ 2Λ2 − Λ1 +
a2τu(1− αP2)
τ2
−
a1τu(1− αP1)
τ1
< 0
⇔ τǫ2 >
τi1
1 + γτua1
,
and given that (1 + γτua1)
−1τi1 > τǫ1 , we can conclude that with no residual uncertainty and
i.i.d. liquidity trades’ increments, returns are positively correlated provided that investors
receive private information at all trading dates (i.e., τǫn > 0, for all n), and the quality of such
information shows sufficient improvement across periods 1 and 2. In this situation, the impact
of the first period liquidity shock is always stronger than the one coming from u2, building a
positive trend in returns.31 Furthermore, a large second period private precision strengthens
the impact of fundamentals information, eventually yielding Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] > 0.
When β < 1 (keeping τ−1δ = 0), liquidity trades’ persistence is lower and this helps to
generate a negative covariance. As a result, the value of τǫ2 which is needed for the model
30In the market with homogeneous information if β = 1, Λn = (γτv)
−1(1 + κ), for n = 1, 2, 3.
31Formally, 2Λ2 − Λ1|τǫ2=(1+γa1τu)−1τi1 < 0.
27
to display momentum, increases. Adding residual uncertainty lowers investors’ responsiveness
to private information. This, in turn, implies that for any β, the value of τǫ2 that triggers
momentum further increases (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: The figure displays the set {(β, τǫ2) ∈ [0, 1]×R+|Cov[p3−p2, p2−p1] = 0}, partitioning
the parameter space [0, 1] × R+ into two regions: points above the plot identify the values of
(β, τǫ2) such that there is momentum. Points below the plot identify the values of (β, τǫ2) such
that there is reversal. Parameters’ values are τv = τu = τǫ1 = τǫ3 = 1. The thin, thick and
dotted line respectively correspond to τ−1δ = 0, τ
−1
δ = .2, and τ
−1
δ = .3.
Summarizing, when β = 0 as argued in section 6 the Keynesian equilibrium realizes. There
we obtain that prices score worse than consensus at predicting the fundamentals. Investors
accommodate a positive expected liquidity demand, as the consensus opinion is that prices
systematically revert. Furthermore, returns are negatively correlated. As β grows larger,
for intermediate values of the residual uncertainty parameter, the Hayekian equilibrium may
occur, with prices that are closer to the fundamentals compared to the consensus opinion.
Upon observing a positive realization of the expected liquidity demand, investors chase the
trend, as in this case the consensus opinion is that prices will systematically increase. In this
equilibrium, momentum obtains provided that the quality of investors’ private information
improves sufficiently across trading dates. Momentum and reversal are therefore compatible
with both types of equilibria.32
Inspection of Figure 3 suggests that for a given τǫ2 , higher values of 1/τδ require a larger
liquidity trades’ persistence for Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] = 0. Numerical simulations confirm this
insight, showing that the set of parameter values (β, 1/τδ) for which Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] = 0,
and where therefore return predictability based on the observation of prices is not possible, has
the shape displayed by the thick line in Figure 4. Points above (below) the thick line represent
combinations of (β, 1/τδ) such that the third period returns display reversal (momentum),
32Therefore, as momentum can arise also in the Keynesian region, a price runup is entirely compatible with
a situation in which prices are farther away from the fundamentals compared with the consensus opinion.
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so that Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] < 0 (Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] > 0). It is useful to also draw the set
Ω2 = {(β, 1/τδ) ∈ [0, 1]×R+|αP2 = αE2} for the chosen parameter configuration. This partitions
the parameter space [0, 1]×R+ into four regions. Starting from the region HR in which prices
are worse predictors of fundamentals compared to consensus and returns display reversal and
moving clockwise, we have the region HM in which prices are closer to fundamentals compared
to consensus and momentum occurs; the region KM where prices are worse at estimating
fundamentals compared to consensus and momentum occurs; the region KR in which prices
are worse predictors of fundamentals compared to consensus and reversal occurs.33
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Figure 4: The figure displays the set Ω2 = {(β, 1/τδ) ∈ [0, 1] × R+|αP2 = αE2} (thin line) and
the set {(β, 1/τδ) ∈ [0, 1] × R+|Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] = 0} (thick line). Parameters’ values are
τv = 1/25, τu = 1/0.011
2, γ = 1/2 and τǫ1 = 1/144, τǫ2 = τǫ3 = 4/144.
According to Corollary 9, in the Hayekian (Keynesian) region investors’ short term strategies
reflect the consensus opinion about the systematic behavior of future prices. For instance, in
the region to the right of Ω2 (i.e., the region H), a systematic positive discrepancy between p2
and E2[v] creates the consensus opinion that the third period price will increase above p2. This
rationalizes informed investors’ decisions to ride the market upon observing p2 − E2[v] > 0.
As Figure 4 clarifies, in this region the consensus opinion about the systematic future price
behavior does not always coincide with the forecast based on unconditional correlation. Indeed,
suppose that at time 2 investors observe p2 > p1 > E2[v]. For (β, 1/τδ) ∈ HR, unconditional
correlation predicts that the short term increase in prices across the first two periods will be
followed by a reversal, in stark contrast with the prediction based on the consensus opinion.
To understand the reason for this difference, it is useful to refer to the case with homogeneous
information. In that case, upon observing the realization of a positive demand from liquidity
traders θ2 > 0, investors speculate on short run price differences by taking the other side of
the market. Furthermore, unconditional correlation predicts a price reversal. Indeed, with
33In the figure we use parameters’ values in line with Cho and Krishnan (2000)’s estimates based on S&P500
data. Thus, we set τv = 1/25, τu = 1/0.011
2, γ = 1/2 and τǫ1 = 1/144, τǫ2 = τǫ3 = 4/144.
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homogeneous information the only factor moving prices is represented by liquidity traders’
demand which is transient. Therefore, both a positive liquidity stock and a price increase are
deemed to be temporary. In the presence of heterogeneous information, on the other hand,
fundamentals information, which is persistent, also affects prices. This contrasts the mean
reverting impact of liquidity trading, creating a signal extraction problem, and implying that
investors have to base their short term strategies on the realization of the expected stock of
liquidity trades, E2[θ2], filtered out of the observed aggregate demand. In this situation, it is
natural that the anticipation of future price behavior crucially depends on the information set
on which such a forecast is based.
The latter result is reminiscent of Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt (2008) who study the empirical
implications that a multi-asset, dynamic, noisy rational expectations equilibrium model has for
optimal trading behavior. One of their findings points to the existence of a discrepancy between
momentum strategies based on unconditional correlation and the optimal, price contingent
strategies that investors adopt in their model.34
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the relationship between prices and consensus opinion as
estimators of the fundamentals. We have shown that whenever heterogeneously informed, long
term investors find it optimal to exploit short term price movements, prices can either be
systematically farther away or closer to the fundamentals compared to the consensus opinion.
This gives rise to a Keynesian and a Hayekian region in the space of our deep parameters (i.e.,
the persistence of liquidity trades and the dispersion of residual uncertainty affecting the asset
liquidation value). In the Hayekian (Keynesian) region a systematic positive price departure
from the public expectation about the fundamentals “generates” the consensus opinion that
prices will systematically further rise (decrease) in the upcoming period. On the boundary
between the two regions, on the other hand, the market consensus opinion is that the next
period price won’t change in any systematic way. As a consequence, investors concentrate on
“the asset long term prospects and those only,” abiding by Keynes’s dictum.
Our paper provides a number of empirical implications. According to our results, for a given
level of residual uncertainty, investors tend to use accommodating strategies when liquidity
trading is strongly mean reverting. Conversely, they are trend chasers when liquidity trading is
close to random walk and there is a continuous flow of private information. The latter parameter
region widens when investors are more risk tolerant, receive better private information and a
lower level of liquidity trading affects prices.
Furthermore, as in our setup the evolution of prices is governed by a transient and a per-
sistent component, depending on the quality of private information, our model can generate
empirically documented return regularities. Interacting the space of parameter values yielding
momentum and reversal with the Keynesian and Hayekian regions, we have illustrated that
34Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt (2008) also find that price contingent strategies are empirically superior to
momentum strategies.
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the set of deep parameters yielding the two phenomena are different. As we argued, the con-
sensus opinion can be taken as a measure of the market view of an asset fundamentals which,
differently from the market price, is free from the influence of short term speculation dynam-
ics. Therefore, our theory gives indications as to when a price runup (momentum) should be
associated with a situation in which prices are a better or worse indicator of the liquidation
value compared to consensus. Low residual uncertainty in the liquidation value together with
a high liquidity trades’ persistence are likely to characterize situations of the first type. On
the other hand, low liquidity trades’ persistence (again coupled with low residual uncertainty)
can be responsible for prices growing increasingly apart from fundamentals compared to the
market consensus opinion.35
Overall, our analysis points to the fact that the predictability of the aggregate demand
evolution leads long-term investors to speculate on short-term returns, in turn implying that
the simplistic version of the EMH is likely to fail. We identify two factors which may explain
this result: the persistence of liquidity trades and the opaqueness of fundamentals. Indeed,
as we have shown, low liquidity trades persistence together with opaque fundamentals make
the evolution of the aggregate demand, and thus of the asset returns, predictable. This lures
investors towards the exploitation of these regularities, partially diverting them from the activity
of evaluating the fundamentals. As a result, the equilibrium price ends up reflecting both
components of investors’ strategies (long and short term speculation), decoupling its dynamic
from that of the consensus opinion. In these conditions, we have also argued that reversal
occurs, and prices score worse than consensus in predicting the fundamentals. Momentum,
instead, needs high liquidity trading persistence, and a transparent environment to arise. Hence,
insofar as a high β proxies for a high trading frequency, we can conclude that any technological
arrangement conducive to an increase in trading frequency together with improved disclosure is
likely to promote positive return correlation and prices being better predictors of fundamentals
compared to consensus.
A number of issues are left for future research. Our analysis has concentrated on the
case in which investors have long horizons. Indeed, short term speculation in our setup arises
endogenously whenever investors find it optimal to exploit regularities in the evolution of future
returns.36 Furthermore, while our paper gives a very detailed characterization of the conditions
leading to departures from the simplistic version of the EMH, it does not assess the welfare
35From an empirical point of view, our “Hayekian” and “Keynesian” regions can potentially be identified ex-
post by estimating the covariance of prices and consensus with the fundamentals. This enables to characterize
when situations in which the market view is at odds with prices are a signal that consensus should be trusted
as a better indicator of ex-post liquidation value. Indeed, as we show in Section 7, the fact that momentum
and reversal can occur in both the Hayekian and Keynesian regions implies that in some cases we should trust
price runups to be strong indicators of value (compared to consensus), whereas in other cases, this is not true.
Of course, the testability of these implications relies on the availability of reliable information on consensus
estimates which is not easy to obtain because of incentive issues of market professionals which are likely to
induce biases (see Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and the references cited therein). More recently, however, survey
data based on investor beliefs which circumvent incentive issues start being collected (see, e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen
(2003) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2009)).
36Cespa and Vives (2011) analyze the implications of forcing on investors a short term horizon and show that
in our general framework this is conducive to multiple equilibria with either Keynesian or Hayekian features.
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consequences that this may have for market participants. In particular, in the Keynesian
equilibrium informed investors explicitly take advantage of liquidity traders, exploiting the
low persistence of their demand shocks. A model in which the noise in the price is due to
rational traders entering the market to hedge a shock to their endowment would allow to
analyze the welfare properties of this equilibrium. Furthermore, it would also allow to see
whether in response to informed investors’ activity, liquidity patterns can change over time,
thereby inducing a time-varying degree of liquidity trades’ persistence, and ultimately affecting
the sign and magnitude of the discrepancy between prices and average expectations in the
estimation of fundamentals.
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A Appendix
To characterize the equilibrium and prove its existence we assume that investors recover the sequence
zn ≡ {zt}
n
t=1 of informational additions from the aggregate demand and use it to make inferences
about the ex-post liquidation value. The following lemma establishes that at any linear equilibrium,
working with this sequence is equivalent to working with pn ≡ {pt}
n
t=1:
Lemma A.1. In any linear equilibrium the sequence of informational additions zn is observationally
equivalent to pn.
Proof. Consider a candidate equilibrium in linear strategies xin = ans˜in − ϕn(p
n). In the first period
imposing market clearing yields
∫
1
0
a1si1 − ϕ1(p1)di + θ1 = a1v − ϕ1(p1) + θ1 = 0 or, denoting with
z1 = a1v+θ1 the informational content of the first period order-flow, z1 = ϕ1(p1), where ϕ1(·) is a linear
function. Hence, z1 and p1 are observationally equivalent. Suppose now that z
n−1 = {z1, z2, . . . , zn−1}
and pn−1 = {p1, p2, . . . , pn−1} are observationally equivalent and consider the n-th period market
clearing condition:
∫
1
0
Xn(s˜in, p
n−1, pn)di + θn = 0. Adding and subtracting
∑n−1
t=1 β
n−t+1atv, the
latter condition can be rewritten as follows:
n∑
t=1
zt − ϕn(p
n) = 0,
where ϕn(·) is a linear function, zt = ∆atv + ut denotes the informational content of the t-th period
order-flow, and ∆at = at − βat−1. As by assumption p
n−1 and zn−1 are observationally equivalent, it
follows that observing pn is equivalent to observing zn. ✷
To prove proposition 1 we first present a general argument that characterizes the equilibrium prices
and strategies in the 3-period market. We then specialize the equilibrium system of equations to the
2-period market and show that it always possesses a real solution.
Proposition A.1. Let
∑n
t=1 τǫt > 0, at any linear equilibrium of the 3-period market the equilibrium
price is given by
pn = αPn
(
v +
θn
an
)
+ (1− αPn)En[v], n = 1, 2, 3, (A.1)
where θn = un + βθn−1. For n = 1, 2, an investor’s strategy is given by:
Xn(s˜in, z
n) =
an
αEn
(Ein[v]− pn) +
αPn − αEn
αEn
an
αPn
(pn − En[v]), (A.2)
while at time 3:
X3(s˜i3, z
3) =
a3
αE3
(Ei3[v]− p3), (A.3)
where αEn =
∑n
t=1 τǫt/τin, and expressions for αPn and an are provided in the appendix (see equations
(A.7), (A.25), (A.43), and (A.6), (A.21), (A.46), respectively). The parameters αPn and an are positive
for n = 2, 3. Numerical simulations show that αP1 > 0 and a1 > 0.
Proof. To prove our argument, we proceed backwards. In the last trading period traders act as in a
static model and owing to CARA and normality we have
X3(s˜i3, z
3) = γ
Ei3[v]− p3
Vari3[v + δ]
, (A.4)
and
p3 = αP3
(
v +
θ3
a3
)
+ (1− αP3)E3[v], (A.5)
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where
a3 =
γ
∑
3
t=1 τǫt
1 + κ
, (A.6)
αP3 =
∑
3
t=1 τǫt
τi3
, (A.7)
κ = τ−1δ τi3. An alternative way of writing the third period equilibrium price is
p3 = λ3z3 + (1− λ3∆a3)pˆ2, (A.8)
where
λ3 = αP3
1
a3
+ (1− αP3)
∆a3τu
τ3
, (A.9)
captures the price impact of the net informational addition contained in the 3rd period aggregate
demand, while
pˆ2 =
αP3τ3β(
∑
2
t=1 β
2−tzt) + (1− αP3)a3τ2E2[v]
αP3τ3βa2 + (1− αP3)a3τ2
=
γτ2E2[v] + β(1 + κ)(z2 + βz1)
γτ2 + βa2(1 + κ)
, (A.10)
zn = ∆anv + un, and ∆an = an − βan−1.
Second Period
Substituting (A.4) in the second period objective function, a trader in the second period maximizes
Ei2 [U (pii2 + pii3)] = −Ei2
[
exp
{
−
1
γ
(
(p3 − p2)xi2 +
x2i3Vari3[v + δ]
2γ
)}]
. (A.11)
Let φi2 = (p3 − p2)xi2 + x
2
i3Vari3[v + δ]/(2γ). The term φi2 is a quadratic form of the random vector
Z2 = (xi3 − µ1, p3 − µ2)
′, which is normally distributed (conditionally on {s˜i2, z
2}) with zero mean
and variance covariance matrix
Σ2 =
(
Vari2[xi3] Covi2[xi3, p3]
Covi2[xi3, p3] Vari2[p3]
)
, (A.12)
where
Vari2[xi3] =
(∆a3(1 + κ)− γτǫ3)
2τu + τi2((1 + κ)
2 + γ2τuτǫ3)
τi2τu(1 + κ)2
,
Covi2[xi3, p3] = λ3
(
γτǫ3∆a3τu − (1 + κ)(τ3 +
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)
τi2τu(1 + κ)
)
,
Vari2[p3] = λ
2
3
(
τ3 +
∑
2
t=1 τǫt
τi2τu
)
,
and
µ1 ≡ Ei2[xi3] =
a3(1− λ3∆a3)
αE3
(Ei2[v]− pˆ2) (A.13)
µ2 ≡ Ei2[p3] = λ3∆a3Ei2[v] + (1− λ3∆a3)pˆ2. (A.14)
Writing in matrix form:
φi2 = c2 + b
′
2Z2 + Z
′
2A2Z2,
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where c2 = (µ2 − p2)xi2 + µ
2
1Vari3[v + δ]/(2γ), b2 = (µ1Vari3[v + δ]/γ, xi2)
′, and A2 is a 2× 2 matrix
with a11 = Vari3[v + δ]/(2γ) and the rest zeroes. Using a well-known result from normal theory we
can now rewrite the objective function (A.11) as
Ei2 [U (pii2 + pii3)] = (A.15)
− |Σ2|
−1/2
∣∣Σ−1
2
+ 2/γA2
∣∣−1/2 × exp{−1/γ (c2 − 1
2γ
b′2
(
Σ−1
2
+ 2/γA2
)−1
b2
)}
.
Maximizing the above function with respect to xi2 yields
xi2 = Γ
1
2(µ2 − p2) + Γ
2
2µ1, (A.16)
where
Γ12 =
γ
h2,22
, Γ22 = −
h2,21Vari3[v + δ]
γh2,22
,
and h2,ij denotes the ij-th term of the symmetric matrix H2 = (Σ
−1
2
+ 2/γA2)
−1:
h2,12 = −
λ3τ
2
i3(1 + κ)(1− λ3γτǫ3/(1 + κ))
D2/γ2
(A.17)
h2,22 =
λ23τi3((1 + κ)(τ3 +
∑
2
t=1 τǫt) + τǫ3)
D2/γ2
, (A.18)
and
D2
γ2
= τi3
(
τi3
(
λ23τi2 + (1− λ3∆a3)
2τu
)
+ τi2τuκ
)
. (A.19)
Substituting (A.13) and (A.14) into (A.16) and rearranging yields
X2(s˜i2, z
2) =
a2
αE2
(Ei2[v]− pˆ2)−
γ
h2,22
(p2 − pˆ2) , (A.20)
where a2 denotes the 2nd period trading aggressiveness:
a2 =
γ(
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)τi3(1 + κ)(1 + γτu∆a3)
(1 + κ+ γτu∆a3)(τǫ3 + (τ3 +
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)(1 + κ))
. (A.21)
Imposing market clearing yields∫
1
0
a2
αE2
(Ei2[v]− pˆ2) di−
γ
h2,22
(p2 − pˆ2) + θ2 = 0,
which after rearranging implies
γτ2(βρ2 − 1)
γτ2 + βa2(1 + κ)
E2[θ2] =
γ
h2,22
(pˆ2 − p2), (A.22)
where ρ2 ≡ a2(1 + κ)/(γ
∑
2
t=1 τǫt). As a consequence, a trader i’s second period strategy can be
written as follows:
X2(s˜i2, z
2) =
a2
αE2
(Ei2[v]− p2) +
(γ + h2,21)(βρ2 − 1)τ2
γτi3
E2[θ2]. (A.23)
Using (A.20) we can obtain an expression for the second period equilibrium price that clarifies the
role of the impact of expected noise traders’ demand. Indeed, imposing market clearing yields
a2
αE2
(
E¯2[v]− p2
)
+
(γ + h2,21)(βρ2 − 1)τ2
γτi3
E2[θ2] + θ2 = 0,
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where E¯2[v] ≡
∫
1
0
Ei2[v]di. Isolating p2 and rearranging we obtain
p2 = αP2
(
v +
θ2
a2
)
+ (1− αP2)E2[v], (A.24)
where
αP2 = αE2
(
1 + (βρ2 − 1)Υ
1
2
)
(A.25)
denotes the weight that the second period price assigns to v, and
Υ12 =
γτ2τu(γτ2 + βa2(1 + κ) + γτi2κ)
D2
> 0. (A.26)
Using (A.24) and (A.25) in (A.23) yields:
X2(s˜i2, z
2) =
a2
αE2
(Ei2[v]− p2) +
αP2 − αE2
αE2
a2
αP2
(p2 − E2[v]). (A.27)
Finally, note that in period 2 as well we can obtain a recursive expression for the price that confirms
the formula obtained in (A.8). Indeed, rearranging (A.24) we obtain
p2 = λ2z2 + (1− λ2∆a2)pˆ1, (A.28)
where
λ2 = αP2
1
a2
+ (1− αP2)
∆a2τu
τ2
, (A.29)
measures the price impact of the new information contained in the second period aggregate demand
(since
∫
1
0
xi2di+ θ2 = a2v + θ2 − ϕ2(p1, p2) = z2 + βz1 − ϕ2(p1, p2)), and
pˆ1 =
αP2τ2βz1 + (1− αP2)a2τ1E1[v]
αP2τ2βa1 + (1− αP2)a2τ1
. (A.30)
An alternative expression for λ2 is as follows:
λ2 =
1 + κ+ γτuρ2∆a2
γρ2τi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
λS
2
+ (A.31)
(βρ2 − 1)(1 + κ)τu(γτ2 + βa2(1 + κ) + γτi2κ)(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)
ρ2τi2D2
,
where λS2 denotes the “static” measure of the price impact of trade. The above expression thus
highlights how noise trade predictability and the presence of residual uncertainty affect the static
measure of the price impact of trade.
First Period
To solve for the first period strategy, we now plug (A.16) into the argument of the exponential in (A.15):
c2 −
1
2γ
b′2
(
Σ−1
2
+ 2/γA2
)−1
b2 = (Ei2[p3]− p2)xi2 +
Vari3[v + δ]
2γ
(Ei2[xi3])
2
−
1
2γ
(
Vari3[v + δ]
γ
Ei2[xi3] xi2
)(
h2,11 h2,12
h2,21 h2,22
) Vari3[v + δ]γ Ei2[xi3]
xi2

 .
Carrying out the matrix multiplication and simplifying yields
c2 −
1
2γ
b′2
(
Σ−1
2
+ 2/γA2
)−1
b2 =
1
2γ
(
h2,22x
2
i2 +
γ2(1 + κ)2τi2τu
D2
(Ei2[xi3])
2
)
,
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implying that
Ei2 [U(pii2 + pii3)] = − |Σ2|
−1/2
∣∣Σ−1
2
+ (2/γ)A2
∣∣−1/2×
exp
{
−
1
2γ2
(
h2,22x
2
i2 +
γ2(1 + κ)2τi2τu
D2
(Ei2[xi3])
2
)}
.
The first period objective function now reads as follows:
Ei1 [U (pii1 + pii2 + pii3)] = −Ei1
[
exp
{
−
1
γ
(
(p2 − p1)xi1 (A.32)
+
1
2γ
(
h2,22x
2
i2 +
γ2(1 + κ)2τi2τu
D2
(Ei2[xi3])
2
))}]
.
Note that since
Ei2[xi3] =
γτ2
1 + κ
(Ei2[v]− E2[v])− βEi2[θ2],
we have
Ei2[v]− E2[v] =
(1 + κ)(Ei2[xi3] + βEi2[θ2])
γτ2
,
and replacing the latter in the expression for xi2 yields
Ei2[xi3] =
xi2 + (1− βρ2)Ei2[θ2]
ρ2
. (A.33)
Thus, denoting by φi1 the argument of the exponential in (A.32) we obtain:
φi1 = (p2 − p1)xi1 +
1
2γ
(
h2,22x
2
i2 +
γ2(1 + κ)2τi2τu
D2
(
xi2 + (1− βρ2)Ei2[θ2]
ρ2
)2)
.
Finally, as one can verify, letting ν1 = αE2 , ν2 = −(λ2τi2)
−1(τ2 − a2∆a2τu), and ν3 = 1, we have
ν1xi2 + ν2p2 + ν3Ei2[θ2] =
1
λ2τi2
(∆a2τuβz1 − τ1E1[v]) ≡ c(z1), (A.34)
implying that
Ei2[θ2] = c(z1)− αE2xi2 +
τ2 − a2∆a2τu
λ2τi2
p2.
Given a trader’s information set at time 1, c(z1) is a constant. Hence, the uncertainty that a trader i
faces at time 1 is reflected in φi1 through p2 and xi2 only:
φi1 = (p2 − p1)xi1 +
1
2γ
(
h2,22x
2
i2 +
γ2(1 + κ)2τi2τu
ρ2
2
D2
× (A.35)
(
(1− (1− βρ2)αE2)xi2 + c(z1)(1− βρ2) +
(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)(1− βρ2)
λ2τi2
p2
)2)
.
The term φi1 is a quadratic form of the random vector Z1 ≡ (xi2 − µ1, p2 − µ2), which is normally
distributed conditionally on {si1, z1} with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix
Σ1 =
(
Vari1[xi2] Covi1[xi2, p2]
Covi1[xi2, p2] Vari1[p2]
)
,
where µ1 ≡ Ei1[xi2],
µ1 =
(1− λS2∆a2)a2
αE2
(Ei1[v]− pˆ1) +
a2τ1(αP2 − αE2)
αP2αE2τ2
(pˆ1 − E1[v]), (A.36)
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and µ2 ≡ Ei1[p2],
µ2 = λ2∆a2Ei1[v] + (1− λ2∆a2)pˆ1, (A.37)
while
Vari1[xi2] =
(∆a2
∑
2
t=1 τǫt − a2τǫ2)
2τu + τi1((
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)
2 + a22τuτǫ2)
(
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)
2τi1τu
Covi1[xi2, p2] = λ2
(
a2∆a2τuτǫ2 − (τ2 + τǫ1)(
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)
(
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)τi1τu
)
Vari1[p2] = λ
2
2
(
τ2 + τǫ1
τi1τu
)
.
Writing in matrix form:
φi1 = c1 + b
′
1Z1 + Z
′
1A1Z1,
where
c1 = (µ2 − p1)xi1 + a11µ
2
1 + a22µ
2
2 +m3c(z1)
2 + 2(m1µ1c(z1) +m2µ2c(z1) + a12µ1µ2),
b1 = (2(a11µ1 + a12µ2 +m1c(z1)), 2(a22µ2 + a12µ1 +m2c(z1)) + xi1)
′, and
A1 =
(
a11 a12
a12 a22
)
,
with
a11 =
h2,22
2γ
+
a22
ν2
2
(
1− (1− βρ2)αE2
1− βρ2
)2
a12 = −
a22
ν2
(
1− (1− βρ2)αE2
1− βρ2
)
a22 =
(ν2(1− βρ2))
2
2γ
(
γ2(1 + κ)2τi2τu
ρ2
2
D2
)
,
and
m1 =
a22
ν2
2
1− (1− βρ2)αE2
1− βρ2
, m2 = −
a22
ν2
, m3 =
a22
ν2
2
.
Along the lines of the second period maximization problem we then obtain
Ei1 [U (pii1 + pii2 + pii3)] = (A.38)
−|Σ1|
−1/2|Σ−1
1
+ 2/γA1|
−1/2 exp
{
−1/γ
(
c1 −
1
2γ
b′1
(
Σ−1
1
+ 2/γA1
)−1
b1
)}
.
Maximizing (A.38) with respect to xi1, solving for xi1 and rearranging yields
X1(si1, p1) = Γ
1
1Ei1[p2 − p1] + Γ
2
1Ei1[xi2] + Γ
3
1Ei1 [xi3] , (A.39)
where
Γ11 =
γ
h1,22
, Γ21 = −
h1,12h2,22
γh1,22
Γ31 = −
γ2(1 + κ)2τu((βρ2 − 1)τi2ν2h1,22 + τi3(1− λ3∆a3)h1,12)
D2h1,22
.
and the terms h1,ij denote the ij-th elements of the symmetric matrix H1 = (Σ
−1
1
+ 2/γA1)
−1:
h1,22 =
τi3
Φ1D2ρ22τǫ2
(
(1 + κ)2((τ2 + τǫ1)(κτu + λ
2
3τi3) + (1− λ3∆a3)
2τi3τu) (A.40)
+ λ23ρ
2
2τǫ2
(
(1 + κ)
(
τ3 +
2∑
t=1
τǫt
)
+ τǫ3
))
,
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h1,12 =
(1 + κ)2
Φ1D2ρ22τǫ2γ
2τi2λ2(
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)
((
a2∆a2τuτǫ2 − (τ2 + τǫ1)
(
2∑
t=1
τǫt
))
D2 (A.41)
+(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)(βρ2 − 1)τuτi3(1− λ3∆a3)γ
2τǫ2
2∑
t=1
τǫt
)
,
and
Φ1 = |Σ1|
−1
(
1 +
2a22
γ
(
Vari1[p2] + Vari1[xi2]
τ2i3(1− λ3∆a3)
2
ν2
2
τ2i2(1− βρ2)
2
−2
τi3(1− λ3∆a3)
ν2τi2(1− βρ2)
Covi1[p2, xi2]
)
+
h2,22Vari1[xi2]
γ2
)
+ 2
a22h2,22
γ3
.
Substituting (A.36) and (A.37) into (A.39) and imposing market clearing, yields
p1 = αP1
(
v +
θ1
a1
)
+ (1− αP1)E1[v], (A.42)
where
αP1 = αE1
(
1 + (βρ1 − ρ2)Υ
1
1 + (βρ2 − 1)Υ
2
1
)
, (A.43)
denotes the weight that the first period price assigns to the fundamentals and
Υ11 =
(
γ
h1,22
−
a1
αE1
)
h1,22ρ1τ1αE2
γa2(1− λ2∆a2)
, (A.44)
Υ21 =
(
1−
h1,22
γ
(
γ
h1,22
−
a1
αE1
))
γβτ1τu
h1,22(1− λ2∆a2)D2
×(
γτi3λ3(1 + κ)
3(1 + γτu∆a3)Φ2
ρ2
2
D2λ2
− h1,12h2,22(τi3(1− λ3∆a3) + τi2κ)
)
(A.45)
−
(
γ
h1,22
−
a1
αE1
)
h1,22ρ1τ1
∑
2
t=1 τǫt
γa2τ2(1− λ2∆a2)
τ2τu(a2(1 + κ) + γτ2βρ1)(τi3(1− λ3∆a3) + τi2κ)
τi2D2
,
and a1 denotes a trader i’s first period private signal responsiveness:
a1 =
αE1
h1,22
(
λ2∆a2(γ − 2(h1,22a22 + h1,12a12))+ (A.46)
− 2(h1,22a12 + h1,12a11)
(
a2τ1∑
2
t=1 τǫt
+ βa1
))
.
Using (A.42) in (A.39) and rearranging yields
X1(si1, z1) =
a1
αE1
(Ei1[v]− p1) +
αP1 − αE1
αE1
a1
αP1
(p1 − E1[v]). (A.47)
Note that (A.47), together with (A.42) show that the expressions for equilibrium prices and traders’
strategies have a recursive structure. Finally, note that as obtained in periods 2 and 3, we can express
the first period equilibrium price as follows
p1 = λ1z1 + (1− λ1a1)v¯,
where
λ1 = αP1
1
a1
+ (1− αP1)
a1τu
τ1
.
This completes our proof.
✷
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Proof of Proposition 1
To prove existence we specialize the expressions for the equilibrium parameters to the 2-period
case. Therefore in the second period we obtain
a2 =
γ
∑
2
t=1 τǫt
1 + κ
, (A.48)
where κ ≡ τ−1δ τi2, and αP2 = αE2 . In the first period, we have
a1 =
γτǫ1τi2(1 + κ)(1 + γτu∆a2)
(1 + κ+ γτu∆a2)(τǫ2 + (τ2 + τǫ1)(1 + κ))
, (A.49)
and
αP1 = αE1 (1 + (βρ1 − 1)Υ1) , (A.50)
where
Υ1 =
τ1τu(γτ1 + βa1(1 + κ) + γτi1κ)
γτi2(τi2(λ22τi1 + (1− λ2∆a2)
2τu) + τi1τuκ)
. (A.51)
Note that (A.48) together with (A.49) defines a system of non-linear equations. Let us denote with
f(a1, a2) = 0 the equation defining a2, and with g(a1, a2) = 0 the equation defining a1. Both f(·) and
g(·) are continuous. In particular, it is easy to check that f(a1, a2) = (τδ+
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)(a
3
2τu− 2a
2
2a1τu+
a2(τ1 + a
2
1τu)) − γτδ(
∑
2
t=1 τǫt) = 0 is a nondegenerate cubic in a2, given that (τδ +
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)τu > 0,
and always admits a real solution for any a1. Furthermore, since ∂f/∂a2 = (τδ +
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)(3a
2
2τu −
4a2a1τu+ τ1+ a
2
1τu) and the discriminant associated to this quadratic equation in a1 can be shown to
be negative, we have that ∂f/∂a2 6= 0 and the solutions to the cubic equation are continuous in a1.
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Hence, denoting by a2(a1) a (real) solution to the cubic, we have that
lim
a1→0
a2(a1) = a¯2 > 0, lim
a1→∞
a2(a1) = 0.
We can now verify that a real solution always exists to the equation g(a1, a2(a1)) = 0. Indeed,
lim
a1→0
g(a1, a2(a1)) = γτδτǫ1 (1 + a¯2γτu)
(
τv + a¯
2
2τu +
2∑
t=1
τǫt + τδ
)
> 0,
lim
a1→∞
g(a1, a2(a1)) = −∞,
and the result follows.
✷
As in the case with heterogeneous information, we first present the argument for the 3-period
market with symmetric information and then specialize the equilibrium expressions to the 2-period
case.
Proposition A.2. In the 3-period market with no private information, there exists a unique equilib-
rium in linear strategies, where prices are given by
pn = v¯ + Λnθn, (A.52)
where
Λ3 =
1 + κ
γτv
(A.53)
Λ2 = Λ3
(
1 +
(β − 1)γ2τuτv
1 + κ+ γ2τuτv
)
(A.54)
Λ1 = Λ2
(
1 +
(β − 1)γ2τuτv((1 + κ)(1− β) + γ
2τuτv)
(1 + κ+ γ2β2τuτv)(1 + κ) + γ2τuτv(1 + κ+ γ2τuτv)
)
, (A.55)
and κ = τv/τδ. Risk averse speculators trade according to
Xn(p
n) = −Λ−1n (pn − v¯), n = 1, 2, 3. (A.56)
37Indeed, as one can check ∆ ≡ 16a21τ
2
u − 12τu(τ1 + a
2
1τu) = −(8a
2
1τu + 12τv)τu < 0.
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Proof. Suppose that τǫ1 = τǫ2 = τǫ3 = 0. Then, since in equilibrium
a3 =
γ
∑
3
t=1 τǫt
1 + κ
a2 =
γ(
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)τi3(1 + κ)(1 + γτu∆a3)
(1 + κ+ γτu∆a3)(τǫ3 + (τ3 +
∑
2
t=1 τǫt)(1 + κ))
,
we immediately obtain a2 = a3 = 0. Note that this is in line with what one should assume in a linear
equilibrium where traders possess no private information. Indeed, at any candidate linear equilibrium
a trader’s strategy at time n is given by Xn(p
n) = ϕ(pn), where ϕ(·) is a linear function. Imposing
market clearing, in turn implies that ϕ(pn) = θn, so that at any linear equilibrium the price only
incorporates the supply shock (an = 0) which is therefore perfectly revealed to risk averse speculators.
This, in turn, implies that τn = τin = τv,
En[v] = Ein[v] = v¯,
and that αPn = αEn = 0. Now, we can go on and characterize the strategies that traders adopt, using
the expressions that appear in proposition 1 in the paper:
X3(p
3) =
γτv
1 + κ
(v¯ − p3) (A.57)
X2(p
2) =
γτv
1 + κ
(v¯ − p2) +
(β − 1)γ3τ2v τu
(1 + κ)(1 + κ+ βγ2τuτv)
(p2 − v¯). (A.58)
The second component of the latter expression, in particular, comes from the fact that
lim
τǫn→0
αP1 − αE1
αE1
a1
αP1
=
(β − 1)γ3τ2v τu
(1 + κ)(1 + κ+ βγ2τuτv)
.
Imposing market clearing we obtain:
p2 = v¯ +
(β − 1)(1 + κ)γτu
1 + κ+ γ2τvτu
E2[θ2] +
1 + κ
γτv
θ2. (A.59)
Given that a2 = 0, z2 = u2, and since traders at time 2 have also observed z1 = θ1, the second period
stock of noise θ2 = βθ1 + u2 can be exactly determined, and
E2[θ2] = θ2.
Hence, as argued above, traders perfectly anticipate the noise shock and accommodate it, and the
price only reflects noise. But then this implies that
p2 = v¯ +
(β − 1)(1 + κ)γτu
1 + κ+ γ2τvτu
θ2 +
1 + κ
γτv
θ2. (A.60)
As a last step we need to characterize the first period equilibrium. Substituting the second period
optimal strategy in the corresponding objective function and rearranging, at time 1 a trader chooses
xi1 to maximize
−Ei1
[
exp
{
−
1
γ
(
(p2 − p1)xi1 +
(1 + κ)(1 + κ+ γβ2τvτu)
2γτv(1 + κ+ γ2τvτu)
θ22
)}]
.
According to (A.59) p2 only depends on θ2. Hence, in the first period the argument of the trader’s
objective function is a quadratic form of the random variable θ2 which is normally distributed:
θ2|θ1 ∼ N
(
βθ1, τ
−1
u
)
⇒ (θ2 − βθ1)|θ1 ∼ N
(
0, τ−1u
)
,
and we can apply the usual transformation to compute the above expectation, obtaining that the
function maximized by the trader is given by
(v¯ − p1)xi1 + βθ1(m1xi1 +m2βθ1)−
1
2γ(τu + (2/γ)m2)
(m1xi1 + 2m2βθ1)
2,
44
where
m1 =
(1 + κ+ γ2βτuτv)(1 + κ)
(1 + κ+ γ2τuτv)γτv
, m2 =
(1 + κ+ γ2β2τuτv)(1 + κ)
(1 + κ+ γ2τuτv)2γτv
.
Computing the first order condition and solving for xi1 yields
X1(p1) =
γτv
1 + κ
(v¯ − p1) (A.61)
+
(β − 1)((1 + κ+ γ2τuτv)(1 + κ+ γ
2τuτv(1 + β)) + (1 + κ)
2(1− β))
(1 + κ)(1 + κ+ βγ2τuτv)((1 + κ+ γ2βτuτv)2 + βγ4τ2uτ
2
v (1− β))
(p1 − v¯).
Imposing market clearing and explicitly solving for the price
p1 = v¯ + Λ1θ1, (A.62)
where
Λ1 =
(
γτv
1 + κ
−
(β − 1)((1 + κ+ γ2τuτv)(1 + κ+ γ
2τuτv(1 + β)) + (1 + κ)
2(1− β))
(1 + κ)(1 + κ+ βγ2τuτv)((1 + κ+ γ2βτuτv)2 + βγ4τ2uτ
2
v (1− β))
)−1
,
which can be rearranged to obtain (A.55).
Using the expression for the equilibrium price we can compute the the covariance between second
and third period returns which appears in Section 5:
Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] = (Λ2 (βΛ3 − Λ2) + β (βΛ3 − Λ2) (βΛ2 − Λ1)) τ
−1
u
=
(
βΛ3 − Λ2
τu
)(
Λ2
(
1 + β2
)
− βΛ1
)
.
Using (A.53), (A.54), and (A.55) we can then sign the above expression. In particular, it is easy to
see that Λ1 < Λ2. Therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition for Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] < 0 is that
(βΛ3 − Λ2) < 0, and direct computation shows that
βΛ3 − Λ2 = (β − 1)Λ3
1 + κ
1 + κ+ γ2τuτv
< 0,
for all β ∈ [0, 1).
✷
Proof of Proposition 2
The expressions in (29) and (30) are readily obtained by moving the time indexes in (A.53)
and (A.54) one period down.
✷
Proof of Corollary 4
When τ−1δ = 0, κ = 0 and from (A.48), and (A.49) an = γ(
∑n
t=1 τǫt). As a consequence ρ1 = 1
and from (A.50)
αP1 = αE1
(
1 + (β − 1)
τ1τu(γτ1 + βa1)
γτ2i2(λ
2
2
τi1 + (1− λ2∆a2)2τu)
)
,
so that αP1 ≤ αE1 if and only if β ≤ 1. ✷
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Proof of Corollary 6
The first part follows immediately from (A.50) and (A.51). For the second part notice that in any
equilibrium a1 > 0, hence if 1 + γτu∆a2 > (<)0, then also 1 + κ+ γτu∆a2 > (<)0.
38 Notice also that
if ∆a2 < 0 then 1 + κ+ γτu∆a2 < 0. To see this last point, compute ∆a2 using (A.48) and (A.49):
∆a2 = (A.63)
γ
D
(
τǫ2(1 + κ+ γτu∆a2)(τǫ2 + τǫ1 + τ2(1 + κ))− τǫ1κ(1 + κ)γτu∆a2
(
τ2 +
2∑
t=1
τǫt
))
,
where D = (1 + κ + γτu∆a2)(τǫ2 + (τ2 + τǫ1)(1 + κ))(1 + κ). Suppose that ∆a2 < 0 but that
(1 + κ+ γτu∆a2) > 0, then given (A.63) this is impossible.
To prove our claim start by assuming that ∆a2 > 0, then using (A.49) we can directly check
whether ρ1 < 1 since as one can see
a1 <
γτǫ1
1 + κ
⇔ τǫ2(1 + γτu∆a2 + κ) + (1 + κ)
(
τ2 +
2∑
t=1
τǫt
)
γτu∆a2 < 0,
which is clearly impossible. If, on the other hand ∆a2 < 0, given what we have said above for ρ1 < 1
we need
τǫ2(1 + γτu∆a2 + κ) + (1 + κ)
(
τ2 +
2∑
t=1
τǫt
)
γτu∆a2 > 0,
which is again impossible. Therefore, at any linear equilibrium ρ1 > 1.
✷
Proof of Corollary 8
Note that for τ−1δ = 0, κ = 0, and (A.6) (A.21) imply an = γ(
∑n
t=1 τǫt), for n = 2, 3. Hence,
ρ2 = 1 and (A.31), (A.25) respectively become:
λ2 =
1 + γτu∆a2
γτ2 + a2
+
(β − 1)τu(γτ2 + βa2)(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)
τi2D2
(A.64)
αP2 = αE2
(
1 +
(β − 1)γτ2τu(γτ2 + βa2)
D2
)
, (A.65)
so that
Υ12 =
γτ2τu(γτ2 + βa2)
D2
> 0.
In the first period tedious algebra allows to show that
h1,12 = −
λ2τ
2
i2(1− λ2γτǫ2)
D1
, h1,22 =
(λ2τi2)
2
D1
, (A.66)
where
D1 = τ
2
i2
(
λ22τi1 + (1− λ2∆a2)
2τu +
(β − 1)2(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)
2τuh2,22
D2
)
. (A.67)
Substituting (A.36), (A.37), and (A.66) in (A.39) and rearranging yields:
X1(si1, p1) =
a1
αE1
(Ei1[v]− p1) +
γ
h1,22
(1− τi1h1,22)(pˆ1 − p1) (A.68)
−
γτuτ1β(β − 1)
2(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)(γτi3λ3)
2
λ2(1− λ2∆a2)D22
E1[θ1].
38For suppose a1 < 0, then ∆a2 > 0 and both 1 + γτu∆a2 > 0 and 1 + γτu∆a2 + κ > 0, implying a1 > 0, a
contradiction.
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Using (A.66), we can now simplify (A.46) to obtain
a1 =
τǫ1
λ2τi1τi2
(
D1∆a2
τi2
− (γτ1 + βa1)(∆a2τu(1− λ2∆a2)− λ2τi1)+
−
(1− β)(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)∆a2τu(γ(1− β)(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)− (γτ2 + βa2)(1− λ2γτǫ2))
D2
)
= γτǫ1 , (A.69)
since, as one can verify,
D1
τi2
= λ2τi1(1 + γ∆a2τu) + (1− λ2∆a2)τu(γτ1 + βa1)+
+
(1− β)(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)∆a2τu(γ(1− β)(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)− (γτ2 + βa2)(1− λ2γτǫ2))
D2
.
Finally, imposing market clearing yields
(β − 1)τ1
1− λ2∆a2
(
αP2(β − 1)(1− αE2) + αP2 − αE2
αE2τ2(β − 1)
(A.70)
+
β(β − 1)γτu(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)(γτi3λ3)
2
λ2D22
)
E1[θ1] =
γ
h1,22
(pˆ1 − p1).
We can now substitute (A.70) in (A.68). Imposing market clearing and rearranging allows to obtain
an expression for the first period price as (A.42), where
αP1 = αE1
{
1 +
(β − 1)γτ1(1− h1,22τi1)
1− λ2∆a2
αP2
a2
+
(β − 1)τ1
1− λ2∆a2
× (A.71)(
h1,22τi1
β(1− β)γτu(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)(γτi3λ3)
2
λ2D22
+ (1− h1,22τi1)
αP2 − αE2
αE2τ2(β − 1)
)}
.
Finally, for αP2 , using (A.65), the result stated in the corollary is immediate. For αP1 , inspection
of (A.71) shows that αP1 < αE1 if and only if β < 1 since the sum of the terms multiplying β − 1:
Υ11 +Υ
2
1 =
γτ1(1− h1,22τi1)
1− λ2∆a2
αP2
a2
+
τ1
1− λ2∆a2
×(
h1,22τi1
β(1− β)γτu(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)(γτi3λ3)
2
λ2D22
+ (1− h1,22τi1)
αP2 − αE2
αE2τ2(β − 1)
)
,
can be verified to be always positive.
✷
Proof of Corollary 9
For the first part of the corollary, consider the following argument. From the first order condition
of the trader’s problem in the second period
xi2 = γ
Ei2[p3 − p2]
h2,22
−
h2,21(1 + κ)
γh2,22
Ei2[xi3].
Imposing market clearing, using (A.13) and (A.14), and rearranging yields
τ2(βρ2 − 1)
h2,22τi3(1− λ3∆a3)
(
h2,22 −
λ3∆a3(1 + κ)
ρ2τi2
)
E2[θ2]−
h2,21(1 + κ)(1− αE2)(1− βρ2)
γh2,22ρ2τi2τi3
E2[θ2]
+
(
1 +
αE2
a2
(
h2,21(1 + κ)a3(1− λ3∆a3)
γh2,22τi3αE3
−
γλ3∆a3
h2,22
))
θ2 = 0.
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The first line in the above equation respectively captures the impact that the expected change in price
and the expected third period position have on traders’ aggregate second period strategy. Rearranging
the term multiplying θ2 in the second line yields
1 +
αE2
a2
(
h2,21(1 + κ)a3(1− λ3∆a3)
γh2,22τi3αE3
−
γλ3∆a3
h2,22
)
= 1 +
αE2
a2
(
−
a2
αE2
)
= 0.
The above result implies that for any realization of E[E2[θ2]|v] = (a2/αP2)E[p2 − E2[v]|v],
τ2(βρ2 − 1)
h2,22τi3(1− λ3∆a3)
(
h2,22 −
λ3∆a3(1 + κ)
ρ2τi2
)
E [E2[θ2]|v]
and
−
h2,21(1 + κ)(1− αE2)(1− βρ2)
γh2,22ρ2τi2τi3
E [E2[θ2]|v] ,
must have opposite sign. Given that h2,21 can be verified to be negative, this implies that if (and
only if) βρ2 > 1, E[E¯2[p3 − p2]|v] is positive. If κ = 0, then a similar argument shows that at time 2
E[p2 − E2[v]|v] < 0⇔ E[E¯2[p3 − p2]|v] > 0 for β < 1.
In the absence of residual uncertainty, at time n = 1, using (A.70) and rearranging the market
clearing equation yields
h1,22
γ
(β − 1)τ1
1− λ2∆a2
(
αP2(β − 1)(1− αE2) + αP2 − αE2
αE2τ2(β − 1)
(A.72)
+
β(β − 1)γτu(τ2 − a2∆a2τu)(γτi3λ3)
2
λ2D22
)
E1[θ1] = pˆ1 − p1.
Averaging out noise in the above expression, in this case the sign of E[E¯1[p2 − p1]|v] depends on the
sign of the sum of the term multiplying E[E1[θ1]|v] in the above expression and
λ2∆a2
(
αE1
a1
−
βαP2
a2(1− λ2∆a2)
)
, (A.73)
which after rearranging can be shown to be always negative provided β < 1.
✷
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